







Legal and economic scholarship views the provision of asset partitioning (the 
separation between the assets of the corporation and its shareholders) as the essential 
economic role of corporate personality. This Article contends that this view is 
incomplete. First, it identifies the provision of regulatory partitioning (the separation 
between the legal spheres of the corporation and its shareholders for purposes of the 
imputation of legal rights and duties) as another fundamental function of the 
corporate form. Second, it shows that regulatory partitioning is not absolute. In 
various areas of law and for different purposes, the law “peeks” behind the corporate 
veil to ascribe legal rights or duties of shareholders to the corporation. 
Although veil piercing (asset departitioning) and what I term veil peeking 
(regulatory departitioning) serve different functions and entail distinct tradeoffs, they 
have been almost universally conflated by scholars and courts. This Article examines 
the economic benefits and costs of regulatory partitioning, provides a taxonomy of its 
different exceptions, and argues that veil piercing and veil peeking claims should be 
subject to different criteria. This analysis illuminates and offers normative 
implications for controversies in a variety of legal fields, including constitutional, 
international, tax, corporate, contract, and antitrust law. The reconceptualization of 
the corporation as a “nexus for regulation” as well as a “nexus for contracts” offers an 
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additional, and heretofore overlooked, rationale for the organization of economic 
activity under the corporate form in the United States and around the world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a legal person or entity, a corporation is the repository of rights and 
duties in its own name. It is legally separate from its shareholders and 
managers. Current scholarship has come to regard asset partitioning—the 
separation between the assets of the corporation and those of its 
shareholders—as the essential economic role performed by legal personality.1 
The law also recognizes exceptions to asset partitioning and provides for “de-
partitioning remedies,”2 of which veil piercing is the most prominent.3 
Through veil piercing, courts overcome the attribute of limited liability to 
hold shareholders liable for corporate debts in certain circumstances.4 
 
1 Business corporations exhibit a strong form of asset partitioning. The attribute of limited 
liability or entity shielding prevents corporate creditors from reaching shareholders’ assets. The 
attribute of capital lock-in or strong entity shielding prevents shareholders and their creditors from 
reaching the corporation’s assets. Scholars have argued that entity shielding is more important and 
fundamental to the rise of the firm than limited liability. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 394, 434-35 (2000) (discussing 
the protection of corporate assets against liquidation); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What 
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 440-
41 (2003) (describing the shift to, and motivations behind, incorporation during the nineteenth 
century, and explaining that the pursuit of limited liability was not the sole cause); Henry 
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1335, 1338 (2006) (“[E]ntity shielding is the sine qua non of the legal entity”). Others have described 
legal personality as asset partitioning in mitigating agency costs and shaping capital structure. See 
George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, 
and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (2004); Edward M. 
Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 520-21 
(2007); see also Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Theory of Business Organizations 10, 23 (Amsterdam L. 
Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 2018-32, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3296232 (positing 
that organizational law serves “to depersonalize business” by detaching a pool of assets from the 
individuals behind it); Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as Commitment Device, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
1303, 1306 (2017) (arguing that organizations serve the role of property relinquishment by owners, a 
feature that is complementary to asset partitioning). 
2 Henry Hansmann & Richard Squire, External and Internal Asset Partitioning: Corporations and 
Their Subsidiaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 251, 
252 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
3 Other doctrines that operate to mitigate asset partitioning are substantive consolidation in 
bankruptcy and the use of agency law to treat subsidiaries as agents of the parent company in certain 
circumstances. Id. 
4 There is a voluminous literature on veil piercing. See generally Peter Oh, Veil Piercing, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 81, 90-91 (2010) (discussing empirical research on veil piercing); Robert B. Thompson, 
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991) (offering an 
empirical study of veil-piercing cases); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. 
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Yet asset partitioning is but one dimension of corporate separateness. 
Asset partitioning mostly affects creditor and shareholder rights and is 
particularly well suited to the prevailing economic conception of the 
corporation as a “nexus of contracts”5 (or, more accurately, as a “nexus for 
contracts”6). But beyond its fundamental role as a nexus for contractual 
relationships with private counterparties, the corporation also operates as a 
distinct nexus for the imputation of legal rights and duties vis-à-vis the state, 
including in ways that do not directly implicate asset partitioning.7 The 
corporation is best described as a “nexus of imputation”8 that serves both as a 
“nexus for contracts” and as a “nexus for regulation.” 
To operate as a nexus for both regulation and contracts, the corporate 
form provides for regulatory partitioning, which is the separation between 
the legal spheres of the corporation and its shareholders for purposes of the 
imputation of legal rights and duties beyond the attribution of assets. To 
illustrate, let us look at the example of Alice, a prominent entrepreneur who 
also holds a small number of shares in Apple Inc., a publicly traded company. 
Alice is a French citizen, while Apple is a U.S. company incorporated in 
California. Regulatory partitioning means that Apple is not bound by the 
non-compete covenants that Alice has signed in connection with her business. 
If Alice is convicted of a crime and is therefore debarred from contracting 
with the federal government, Apple is not affected by this sanction. This form 
of separation between the legal spheres of Alice and Apple is essential to the 
 
L. 479 (2001) (advocating the replacement of veil piercing doctrine with direct liability); Jonathan 
Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the 
Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 102 (2014) (conducting an empirical study and suggesting 
that veil piercing serves three distinctive policy goals). 
5 The conception of the firm as a nexus of contracts comes from Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). This conception built on A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information 
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972) (emphasis omitted), which 
described the firm as “the centralized contractual agent in a team productive process.” The phrase 
“nexus of contracts” comes from Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. 
POL. ECON. 288, 293 (1980). 
6 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is Corporate 
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
1, 5 (3d ed. 2017). 
7 This Article refers to rights and duties as a short form for the various related legal concepts 
described in Hohfeld’s classic work, such as disabilities, immunities, privileges, and powers. See 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 
YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913–14) (noting the breadth of the term “rights” and its indiscriminate use to 
cover different concepts). 
8 Legal theorist Hans Kelsen famously described the nature of natural persons and legal 
persons as essentially a point of “imputation” or “central imputation.” HANS KELSEN, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 50 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & 
Stanley L. Paulson trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1934). 
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operation of large-scale enterprise with multiple shareholders and 
transferable shares.9 
This Article identifies the role of regulatory partitioning as an essential, 
but thus far overlooked, form of legal separation supplied by the corporate 
form. A significant portion of corporations around the world are formed for 
regulatory rather than contracting reasons. Importantly, this Article also 
shows that regulatory partitioning is not absolute. In various fields and for 
different purposes, the law engages in what I term veil peeking by looking at 
shareholder characteristics to impute certain rights or duties of shareholders 
to the corporation without compromising the attribute of limited liability to 
reach the personal assets of shareholders. In our example, if Alice were a 
controlling shareholder of Apple, lawmakers and courts would sometimes 
extend Alice’s non-compete obligations and debarment sanctions to Apple, as 
well as deem Apple to be French. 
Regulatory partitioning comes under pressure when there are potential 
differences in the legal regime applicable across natural persons, between 
natural persons and legal entities, or across different legal entities. These 
differences raise important questions. Which legal rights should individuals, 
firms, or states be able to obtain through incorporation? Which legal rights 
should individuals, firms, or states be deemed to forfeit through 
incorporation? To what extent should individuals, firms or states retain their 
legal status despite incorporation? 
The tension between regulatory partitioning and veil peeking lies at the 
heart of key contemporary and perennial controversies involving the 
corporate form. The issues are diverse and momentous. Should the 
fundamental rights of individuals (such as free speech and religious liberty) 
apply to corporations as a vehicle for their exercise? Do a parent and a wholly 
owned subsidiary count as separate entities for purposes of a conspiracy under 
antitrust law? Can a subsidiary be sued based on jurisdictional grounds 
applicable to its parent? Can the race of individual shareholders be imputed 
to the corporation for purposes of antidiscrimination laws? Does the 
nationality of corporate shareholders matter for the application of 
international investment treaties or wartime restrictions? Can citizens raise 
constitutional rights against a corporation whose shares are owned by the 
government? When is it lawful to adopt the corporate form to circumvent 
 
9 In the absence of regulatory partitioning, either destructive legal instability would ensue or 
share transferability would be significantly impaired. This form of regulatory shielding is 
functionally analogous to the key economic role of entity shielding (or affirmative asset 
partitioning), which prevents shareholders’ creditors from attaching corporate assets. See generally 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 390; Hansmann et al., supra note 1, at 1338 (discussing three 
types of entity shielding). 
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legal constraints applicable to individuals or other legal entities, ranging from 
homestead exemptions to non-compete covenants? 
In response to these questions, lawmakers and courts have sometimes 
decided to “peek”—or look behind the corporate veil—to ascribe legal rights 
or duties of shareholders to the corporation, thereby mitigating regulatory 
partitioning.10 Although veil peeking is deep-rooted and recurrent, it has 
largely escaped dedicated analysis.11 From the first article on veil piercing in 
the early twentieth century to countless judicial decisions and pieces of 
scholarship (old and new), veil peeking has been improperly equated with, or 
subsumed under, veil piercing doctrine, which generally holds shareholders 
liable for corporate obligations.12 
 
10 Veil peeking is not to be confused with the regulation of shareholder rights and conduct in 
their own name. Regulatory partitioning separates the legal spheres of shareholders and the 
corporation, but certainly does not eliminate the role of shareholders in corporate governance. 
11 German scholarship has usefully distinguished between the related concepts of “liability 
penetration” (Haftungsdurchgriff) and “imputation penetration” (Zurechnungsdurchgriff) without, 
however, theorizing about their scope, attributes, criteria, and implications. See infra notes 89–90 
and accompanying text. 
12 This conflation dates back to Maurice Wormser’s seminal article coining the term “piercing 
the veil,” which analyzes, in equal proportion, several instances of both veil peeking and veil piercing 
as an exception to limited liability. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. 
L. REV. 496, 498-502, 518 (1912) (collecting cases indicating the courts’ “willingness to adjust the 
entity theory to the evergrowing complexities and constantly increasing problems of the modern 
business corporation”). Today, while both regulatory departitioning and asset departitioning 
continue to be treated under the umbrella of veil piercing, the latter is undoubtedly the dominant 
conception of the term. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 4, at 1036 (“‘Piercing the corporate veil’ 
refers to the judicially imposed exception to this principle by which courts disregard the separateness 
of the corporation and hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation’s action as if it were the 
shareholder’s own.”); Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 481 (“From a litigation standpoint, veil piercing 
allows creditors to satisfy their claims out of the personal assets of shareholders.”). For a 
representative example of the prevailing conflation of veil piercing and veil peeking, see Brief for 
Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6-7, Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. The 
central issue in Hobby Lobby was whether a business corporation qualified as a person for purposes 
of the broad protection of religious liberty provided under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993—a quintessential veil peeking question. See id. at 2 (discussing Hobby Lobby’s argument 
“that the religious values of its present controlling shareholders should pass through to the 
corporation itself ”). In their Amicus Brief, forty-four corporate and criminal law professors cited 
veil piercing authorities for the existence of “very narrow” exceptions to corporate separateness and 
the requirement of a showing of “significant misconduct and fraud” to argue against Hobby Lobby’s 
assertion of religious rights as “reverse piercing.” Id. at 6-7, 16; see also ADAM WINKLER, WE THE 
CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 52-62 (2018) 
(describing the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in attributing constitutional rights to 
corporations as veil piercing). A recent review of Winkler’s book points out that the Supreme 
Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence differs sharply from veil piercing as a doctrinal exception to 
limited liability, but incorrectly assumes that by engaging in veil peeking, “the Supreme Court’s 
[approach] is radically at odds with the existential theory of the corporation it adopts in every other 
area of the law.” Joshua C. Macey, What Corporate Veil?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2019). Instead, 
this Article demonstrates that veil peeking is pervasive. 
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This Article examines veil peeking from a legal and economic perspective 
as a separate category of exceptions to corporate separateness that is 
analytically and functionally distinct from veil piercing. Veil piercing tempers 
asset partitioning by imposing shareholder liability for contracts, torts, or 
regulatory claims. Veil peeking mitigates regulatory partitioning by enabling 
the imputation of shareholder rights or duties to the corporation.13 Because 
asset partitioning and regulatory partitioning serve different functions, veil 
piercing (as asset departitioning) and veil peeking (as regulatory 
departitioning) are subject to distinct tradeoffs. 
In dissociating the regulatory status of the corporation from its 
shareholder composition, regulatory partitioning has important benefits. 
First, it permits shares to be priced and firms to be valued independently of 
shareholder identity. This form of depersonalization of firms—which is also 
aided by limited liability—facilitates share transfers, enhances liquidity, and 
promotes the market for corporate control. Second, regulatory partitioning 
offers a bright-line rule that is easy to apply, which reduces regulatory costs. 
Nevertheless, regulatory partitioning may at times undermine the 
effectiveness of the regulatory scheme in question by encouraging regulatory 
arbitrage, and is therefore set aside through veil peeking. 
By tracing their use in the United States and in other jurisdictions 
throughout history, this Article maps the relative role of regulatory 
partitioning and the broad incidence of veil peeking across different legal 
fields. It also shows that, although clearly distinct from veil piercing along 
several dimensions, veil peeking is not a unitary category. It then advances a 
taxonomy to unpack the different manifestations of veil peeking, which can 
originate from legislatures or courts, benefit or harm shareholder interests, 
and operate in a categorical or tailored fashion. Finally, it examines the extent 
to which veil peeking promotes the use of the corporate form or compromises 
its core attributes, offering guidance for courts and policymakers. 
This analysis produces clear normative implications. It challenges a 
recurrent argument about the effects of corporate personhood, which goes as 
follows: because the corporation is a separate legal person and enjoys limited 
liability, it should be treated as legally separate from its shareholders in all 
areas of law. Scholars have gone as far as to derive concrete normative 
implications from the concept of legal personality, from a stakeholder 
 
13 Alternatively, one could refer to asset departitioning as “liability veil piercing” and to 
regulatory departitioning as “regulatory veil piercing.” Veil peeking (or regulatory veil piercing) is 
not to be confused with liability veil piercing in connection with the enforcement of government 
regulations backed by monetary penalties, as when the state goes after the assets of a parent company 
to collect fines for the violation of environmental law. See infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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orientation in corporate law to a critique of corporate constitutional rights 
grounded on the individual rights of shareholders.14 
By contrast, this Article shows that exceptions to regulatory partitioning 
through veil peeking are pervasive across history and legal fields, which makes 
corporate separateness an “on-and-off” construct depending on the purpose 
of any given form of regulation. Unlike veil piercing, which is inevitably anti-
shareholder and pro-regulation, veil peeking has no clear partisan 
connotation: it can be used both to augment and to frustrate the privileges of 
shareholders and the regulatory power of the state.15 Moreover, asset 
partitioning and regulatory partitioning are not necessarily subject to the 
same boundaries, nor is regulatory partitioning subject to uniform boundaries 
across legal issues or areas of law. 
The Article also offers concrete guidance for courts in adjudicating veil 
peeking cases. It shows that judicial veil peeking essentially concerns the 
interpretation or gap filling of legal texts. It comes into play when the 
constitution, statute, treaty, or contract in question is unclear about the 
treatment of corporate entities. In deciding such controversies, courts should 
rely on the classical tenets of construction or interpretation, and consider the 
extent to which upholding regulatory partitioning would serve to frustrate 
the purpose of the regulatory scheme in question. 
This proposed approach differs sharply from some of the prevailing 
criteria required for veil piercing as an exception to limited liability, whose 
application is deemed to be exceptional, invariably dependent on a fact-
intensive inquiry, and subject to restrictive requirements, such as fraud or 
commingling of assets. Veil peeking does not necessarily pose a threat to the 
core economic functions of the corporation, as frequently assumed. While 
some courts have intuitively grasped the distinction between asset 
departitioning and regulatory departitioning, many others have unduly 
applied inappropriate veil piercing tests to veil peeking controversies. 
 
14 See Jonathan R. Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law 4-5 (U. 
of Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 18-28, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118 
(relying on the conception of the corporation as a juridical entity with limited liability to criticize 
the attribution of constitutional rights to corporations as “associations of citizens”). See generally 
KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 27 
(2018) (linking corporate personhood to a vision of pluralistic governance of corporations); LYNN 
STOUT ET AL., THE MODERN CORPORATION: STATEMENT ON COMPANY LAW 2 (2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848833 (claiming that the concept of legal personhood is incompatible 
with the assertions that shareholders own corporations and that directors are obligated to maximize 
profits for shareholders). 
15 The recurrent uses of veil peeking to augment the regulatory power of the state raise doubt 
about the common reliance on corporate separateness and institutional (“social entity”) conceptions 
of the corporation as a strategy to accomplish progressive objectives. 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the 
critical role of regulatory partitioning and the resulting conception of the 
corporation as a nexus for regulation. Part II describes the emergence of veil 
peeking in the history of the corporate form. Part III presents the key 
structural differences between veil peeking and veil piercing. Part IV unpacks 
the concept of veil peeking by outlining its main functions and offers a 
taxonomy of its different modalities. Part V examines the economic 
properties of regulatory partitioning and veil peeking, evaluating their 
interaction with the core elements of the corporate form. Part VI shows the 
ubiquity and significance of veil peeking controversies in different areas of 
contemporary law, including constitutional, antitrust, international, tax, 
corporate, and contract law. I conclude by highlighting the importance of 
unbundling incorporation to recognize the different functions performed by 
legal personality. 
I. THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS FOR REGULATION 
A leading economic conception of the corporation, which has been 
particularly influential in legal scholarship, emphasizes “the essential 
contractual nature of firms.”16 It views the corporation as a nexus for 
contractual relationships, including those with workers, suppliers, financial 
creditors, shareholders, and even government bodies.17 This nexus-of-
contracts conception, however, fails to mention the key non-contractual 
relationships between the corporation and the state. Such neglect is likely 
attributable, at least in part, to the focus on markets and private ordering that 
characterizes economics as a discipline.18 
 
16 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311. 
17 Id. at 310. 
18 The privatized nexus-of-contracts conception of the corporation deliberately served to 
undermine the defense of corporate social responsibility in the 1970s by offering an alternative to 
the competing concession theory, which viewed incorporation as a favor from the state, and the real 
entity theory, which appeared to support a stakeholder orientation of corporate activities. In their 
seminal work advancing the nexus-of-contract theory, Jensen and Meckling explicitly highlight its 
normative implications in delegitimizing corporate social responsibility. In their words, 
[v]iewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals 
also serves to make it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking 
questions such as “what should be the objective function of the firm?”, or “does the 
firm have a social responsibility” is seriously misleading. 
Id. at 311. In another article in the same period, Jensen and Meckling warned about the destruction 
of the large corporation due to what they viewed as mounting government regulation. See Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Can the Corporation Survive?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 1978, 
at 31, 32 (arguing that, due to growing government intervention in the economy, “[t]he corporate 
form of organization . . . is likely to disappear completely”). 
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Economic theories of the firm often proceed in an institutional and legal 
vacuum, downplaying the role of law and state institutions.19 However, Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have famously showed that law is essential 
for the functioning of the corporate form. It is law, rather than private 
contracting alone, that endows business entities with strong asset 
partitioning, enabling the firm to operate as an effective nexus for contracts.20 
It is also law that endows corporations with regulatory partitioning, which is 
an equally essential, though thus far neglected, attribute of the corporation’s 
role as a nexus for contracts. 
Yet the economic conception of the firm as a nexus for contracts and the 
economic conception of legal entities as a tool for asset partitioning are 
certainly complementary. The key economic function of asset partitioning is 
to economize on contracting costs.21 In fact, law-and-economics scholarship 
has long questioned the efficiency of shareholder limited liability vis-à-vis 
non-contractual creditors, such as tort claimants and the state.22 The legal 
 
19 An exception is the seminal work of Ronald Coase, which mostly equates the economic 
concept of the firm with the legal concept of an employer and employee relationship. R. H. Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403-05 (1937) (“[T]he definition [of a firm] we have given 
is one which approximates closely to the firm as it is considered in the real world.”). For recent 
defenses of the constitutive role of law in the economic concept of the firm, see generally ERIC W. 
ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013); Simon Deakin, David Gindis, 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang & Katharina Pistor, Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the 
Constitutive Role of Law, 45 J. COMPAR. ECON. 188, 194 (2017) (arguing that firms “have to be treated 
as creatures of the law, where law itself is irreducible to custom or private ordering”). 
20 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 393. The authors’ definition of legal entities 
includes organizational forms that lack formal legal personality, such as marriage and the common-
law trust, but which provide for strong or weak forms of asset partitioning. Id. at 390. Although the 
present Article focuses on business corporations, it is important to note that other organizational 
forms also offer regulatory partitioning to varying degrees. For instance, partnerships often do not 
provide for regulatory partitioning with respect to tax and jurisdictional matters, but are treated as 
“collective entities” not subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Similarly, gun trusts were used until recently to avoid identification and background check 
requirements for the purchase of firearms. For a discussion of the varying degrees of regulatory 
partitioning across different legal entities, including partnerships, the trust, and marriage, see 
Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Partitioning as a Key Role of Corporate Personality, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson 
eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 16-20), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3719913. 
The longstanding tension between “entity” and “aggregate” conceptions of partnerships mostly reflect varying 
levels of regulatory partitioning across different areas of law. Id. 
21 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 408 (“Organizational law eliminates the need 
for . . . elaborate contracting and thereby avoids the transaction costs and moral hazard it involves.”). 
22 The very scholars who coined the term asset partitioning have cast doubt on the efficiency 
of limited liability with respect to corporate torts. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879-80, 1882 (1991) (arguing 
that limited liability for corporate torts may promote inefficient behavior and questioning such 
protection). Earlier arguments also questioned the efficiency of limited liability vis-à-vis involuntary 
creditors. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
499, 519-20 (1976) (noting that pursuing separate incorporations for purposes of evading tort 
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relationships between a corporation and the state, however, far transcend the 
liability issues associated with asset partitioning. 
The role of the corporation as a separate nexus for the imputation of rights 
and duties vis-à-vis the state, rather than vis-à-vis contracting parties alone, 
has been central throughout its history. Early corporations required specific 
governmental approval and formed a distinct nexus for regulation, which 
conferred both benefits and costs on this organizational form compared to the 
legal regime governing natural persons and other business associations. A key 
feature of corporate charters up until the mid-nineteenth century was the 
concession of monopoly privileges by the state, an important advantage of 
incorporation that is distinct from asset partitioning.23 
Interestingly, the corporation of the early nineteenth century was not only 
a nexus for regulation, but corporate charter provisions were the technique 
par excellence for state regulation of economic activity. Corporate charters 
commonly regulated the rates to be charged by incorporated firms, especially 
for companies dealing in public utilities and infrastructure.24 Indeed, before 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Munn v. Illinois25 in 1877, it was unclear if 
states even had authority to regulate unincorporated firms.26 
The status of the corporation as a distinct locus for regulation was 
consequential in differentiating the corporate legal regime from the one 
applicable to natural persons and other organizational forms. On the one 
hand, corporations were more likely to be regulated by the state both because 
of explicit charter provisions and because incorporation provided authorities 
 
liability permits the externalization of costs and is socially inefficient); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 111 (1985) (arguing 
that the asymmetrical costs and benefits of absolute limited liability would lead to excessive risk-
taking by corporations). 
23 It was not until 1837 that the U.S. Supreme Court held that a corporate charter does not 
necessarily imply a grant of monopoly privileges. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 
(11 Pet.) 420, 451 (1837). Moreover, entrepreneurs continued to seek special legislative charters for 
purposes of obtaining explicit legal privileges long after general incorporation dispensing with state 
approval became available. See Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the 
Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 143 (1985) (interpreting the continued supply 
of special charters conferring legal privileges after the advent of general incorporation as a strategy 
of market segmentation and price discrimination by rent-seeking legislatures). 
24 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L. J. 
1593, 1628-29 (1988) (“No pre-Civil War American classicist argued that rate regulation should be 
administered by general statute rather than special charter.”). 
25 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (“When . . . one devotes his property to a use in which the public has 
an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled 
by the public for the common good . . . .”). 
26 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 126 (1991). 
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with more information about the firm’s existence and operations.27 On the 
other hand, corporations often enjoyed monopoly rights and benefited from 
constitutional protection against subsequent state impingement on the rights 
conferred by its charter.28 The special regulatory status of business 
corporations vis-à-vis the state may well help explain the attractiveness of the 
corporate form, even as the trust allowed entrepreneurs to obtain most 
corporate attributes (such as lock-in, delegated management, and share 
transferability) without the need for incorporation.29 
However, as special charters granting corporate privileges fell out of favor 
toward the end of the nineteenth century, the locus for state regulation and 
protection shifted from the corporate charter to the general legal regime. 
Three different problems then emerged, giving rise to paradigmatic 
challenges to regulatory partitioning. First, could corporations receive more 
or less favorable regulatory treatment than natural persons or other 
organizational forms? Second, when natural persons were subject to different 
regimes of legal rights or duties, to what extent would this special regime 
transfer to business corporations those persons controlled? Third, when 
would the law treat legal persons as truly separate from their members for 
purposes of legal rights and duties? 
II. THE ORIGINS OF VEIL PEEKING 
Before examining the distinctive features and categories of veil peeking, 
I will briefly describe some of its early manifestations in the history of the 
corporate form. The examples that follow are illustrative, rather than 
exhaustive. They are meant to demonstrate the historical roots, operation, 
and breadth of this phenomenon. I will then dissect its features and evaluate 
its consequences. 
 
27 See Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the 
State, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 112 (1983) (“By incorporating, a firm was effectively announcing 
its existence to the regulatory authorities, who would otherwise most probably have ignored it.”). 
28 One reason why the limited partnership was less attractive than the corporate form in the 
United States was that, in lacking a state-granted charter, it did not benefit from constitutional 
Contract Clause protection against subsequent regulation. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1596. For 
a discussion of constitutional Contract Clause protection as an instance of veil peeking, see infra 
notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
29 See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American 
Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2196-97 (2016) (describing the role of the trust as a 
functional substitute for the corporation’s attributes but leaving open the reasons for seeking 
incorporation). Interestingly, the trust itself also emerged in significant part to help individuals 
evade legal obligations vis-à-vis feudal authorities, such as death taxes and military obligations, by 
manipulating the nexus for imputation. Id. at 2152 (“The trust helped a landowner avoid the feudal 
incidents by allowing him to manipulate the way the law applied. Since the tax only applied to land 
that a man owned in his own name at death, the tax did not apply if the land legally belonged to a 
trustee . . . .”). 
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The role of business organizations in segregating and abstracting a 
shareholder’s legal status has a long historical pedigree. The concealment of 
investor identity was central to the commenda business form of medieval city-
states and the limited partnership (société en commandite simple) of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France, which are prominent precursors 
of limited liability in commercial law.30 In a time of profound Christian 
distaste for commerce and formal bans on its exercise by the nobility, these 
forms permitted noblemen and magistrates to invest in business enterprise as 
passive partners whose identities were hidden.31 This historical experience 
illustrates that the concealment of shareholder identity and legal status—even 
if in deliberate circumvention of existing laws or social norms—may well have 
beneficial economic effects.32 
If the use of business organizations for purposes of regulatory partitioning 
has a long history, so does veil peeking. Veil peeking appears to have preceded 
veil piercing, which should not be surprising given the relatively late 
appearance of limited liability as a universal attribute of the corporate form 
of organization.33 In the famous 1897 decision in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., 
the House of Lords vehemently declined to pierce the corporate veil and 
overcome the protection of asset partitioning provided by the corporate 
form.34 By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court engaged in veil peeking as early 
as 1809 in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux.35 
A. Early Constitutional Cases 
The Deveaux case concerned a tax lawsuit brought by a Georgia tax 
collector against the first Bank of the United States.36 Created by the U.S. 
government after much dispute over the existence of federal powers to charter 
corporations, the Bank remained controversial and was resented by Thomas 
Jefferson and his allies in Georgia, who then sought to impose hefty taxes on 
 
30 See Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the 
American Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511, 524-28 (2003) (arguing that limited liability in 
this context was essentially a corollary of limited partners’ passivity and concealment). 
31 Id. 
32 Interestingly, since the enactment of the Commercial Code in 1807, the corporate form in 
France is known as “anonymous company” (société anonyme), an expression that carried over to 
French-, Spanish-, and Portuguese-speaking jurisdictions to this day. See Code de Commerce [C. 
Com.] [Commercial Code] art. 29 (Fr.) (1807). 
33 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, 
at 94 (1992) (“[T]ruly limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in America even as late as 
1900.”). California law did not provide for limited liability until 1931. Mark I. Weinstein, Share Price 
Changes and the Arrival of Limited Liability in California, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2003). 
34 Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 44, 51 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
35 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91-92 (1809). 
36 For a description of the case and its background, see WINKLER, supra note 12, at 36-37. 
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the institution.37 Seeking to avoid the likely prejudice of the Georgia 
judiciary, the Bank filed suit in federal court based on Article III, Section 2, 
of the U.S. Constitution, which grants federal courts authority to decide 
disputes “between Citizens of different States.”38 
In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[t]hat invisible, intangible, and 
artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not 
a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United 
States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in 
their corporate name.”39 The Court nevertheless engaged in veil peeking to 
find diversity of citizenship, refusing to declare that “the members of the 
corporation were, to every intent and purpose, out of view, and merged in the 
corporation.”40 It decided, instead, to “look to the character of the individuals 
who compose the corporation,” who were citizens of Pennsylvania, thereby 
authorizing federal diversity jurisdiction.41 
Considering the facts before the Court, the decision in Deveaux may well 
have been functional from a constitutional and corporate law perspective. It 
avoided concerns about the partisanship of state courts that underlie the 
constitutional provision for diversity jurisdiction, while in no way compromising 
asset partitioning or other attributes of the corporate form. However, the 
application of the broad method of veil peeking proposed by Deveaux to future 
cases was clearly dysfunctional, leading to its eventual abandonment. 
Given the requirement of complete diversity of citizenship, the presence of 
a single director with the same citizenship as the counterparty was enough to 
defeat the authority of federal courts. This criterion was therefore easily 
manipulated, permitting corporations to avoid diversity jurisdiction through 
opportunistic director appointments before the commencement of 
litigation.42 Starting in 1844, the Supreme Court put an end to veil peeking 
for jurisdictional purposes, instead relying on the state of incorporation for 
the attribution of citizenship.43 Given its dysfunctionality in view of share 
 
37 Id. 
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
39 Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86. 
40 Id. at 91 (emphasis added). 
41 Id. at 91-92 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall, however, did not actually investigate the 
Bank’s membership, which remained “abstract, undefined, and unexamined.” WINKLER, supra note 12, at 67. 
42 See WINKLER, supra note 12, at 106-07 (“[W]hen railroads wanted to escape federal court 
they would add a director from the same state as the plaintiff, thus destroying the necessary diversity 
of citizenship.”). 
43 See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 
(1844) (“[A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all 
intents and purposes . . . an inhabitant of the same state, for the purposes of its incorporation, 
capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural person.”); Marshall v. Balt. & 
Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328-29 (1853) (imposing a conclusive presumption that all 
shareholders are citizens of the state of incorporation). 
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tradability and the mutability of corporate directors, there seems to be no 
other examples of veil peeking based on the identity of non-controlling 
shareholders or of a singular corporate director. 
Another early instance of veil peeking appeared a decade later in the 
prominent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward.44 The Court qualified the charter of Dartmouth College as a 
contract between the donors, the trustees, and the state, holding subsequent 
state laws impinging on charter provisions as an unconstitutional violation of 
the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.45 The practical significance of 
the case, however, gradually declined with the rise of general incorporation 
and the demise of special charters susceptible to being legally qualified as 
contracts with the state. 
B. Enemy Corporations in the World Wars 
Wartime constraints also called into question the strict regime of 
regulatory partitioning provided by the corporate form. While British courts 
have been generally reluctant to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability 
on shareholders,46 the House of Lords engaged in veil peeking as early as 1916 
against the backdrop of World War I in Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and 
Rubber Co. (Great Britain).47 The question in Daimler was whether a company 
incorporated in England, but whose managers and virtually all of whose 
shareholders were German and resided in Germany, qualified as an enemy 
under existing trading prohibitions enacted during World War I.48 Citing 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Deveaux, the court found that it was 
compatible with common law principles “to look, at least for some purposes, 
behind the corporation and consider the quality of its members.”49 
The Daimler opinion by Lord Parker of Waddington effectively 
distinguished between veil piercing and veil peeking without naming names. 
It cited with approval the famous precedent of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. 
for the proposition that a company legally incorporated is an independent 
person with its own rights and liabilities.50 However, Lord Parker of 
 
44 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
45 Id. at 654 (“[I]n these private eleemosynary institutions, the body corporate, as possessing 
the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the purpose of 
executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.”). 
46 Tan Cheng-Han, Jiangyu Wang & Christian Hoffmann, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Historical, 
Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 140 (2019) (describing the cautious 
approach to veil piercing in the United Kingdom). 
47 [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
48 Id. at 308-09. 
49 Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 338 (citing Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1896] AC 22 (HL) 30 (appeal taken from Eng.)). 
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Waddington argued that “it is [not] a necessary corollary of this reasoning to 
say that the character of its corporators must be irrelevant to the character of 
the company; and this is crucial, for the rule against trading with the enemy 
depends upon enemy character.”51 In making this distinction, Lord Parker 
suggested that his veil peeking was justified, at least in part, by the case’s 
wartime context.52 
The Daimler opinion focused on reconciling the legal regimes governing 
legal persons and natural persons, given that the latter could become enemies 
by engaging in active aid or living in enemy territory.53 It held that, for an 
artificial person, the analogue to voluntary residence in enemy territory was 
to be found in corporate control.54 The court thus refused to permit 
the paradoxical result that the King’s enemies, who chance during war to 
constitute the entire body of corporators in a company registered in England, 
thereby pass out of the range of legal vision, and, instead, the corporation, which 
in itself is incapable of loyalty, or enmity, or residence, or of anything but 
bare existence in contemplation of law and registration under some system of 
law, takes their place for almost the most important of all purposes, that of 
being classed among the King’s friends or among his foes in time of war.55 
The United States initially followed a different approach to veil peeking in 
wartime. The original Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 defined as an enemy 
any corporation constituted in enemy territory or established in any country 
other than the United States and doing business in enemy territory.56 The U.S. 
Supreme Court reasoned that this statutory language was deliberately 
“considered in the light of difficulties certain to follow disregard of corporate 
identity and efforts to fix the status of corporations as enemy or not according 
to the nationality of stockholders.”57 Because the statutory language specifically 
addressed enemy corporations and appeared to preclude the Daimler solution, 
the Court therefore permitted regulatory partitioning and refused to attribute 
enemy character to corporations in view of enemy ownership.58 
Congress would eventually amend the Act in 1947 to provide for 
legislative veil peeking by imputing enemy character to corporations that 
 
51 Id. 
52 See id. at 344 (“[T]he truth is that considerations which govern civil liability and rights of 
property in time of peace differ radically from those which govern enemy character in time of war.”). 
53 See id. at 339 (describing how a natural person can take on “enemy character”). 
54 See id. at 340 (describing how an artificial person can adopt enemy character through the 
“acts of a company’s organs”). 
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
56 See Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457, 463 (1925) (quoting Trading with the Enemy 
Act, ch. 106, § 2(a), 40 Stat. 411, 411 (1917) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4302(a)). 
57 Id. at 472. 
58 Id. at 472-73. 
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were at least fifty percent owned or controlled by enemies.59 However, a 
different veil peeking question also emerged. Should courts engage in reverse 
veil peeking60 to protect the rights of innocent (non-enemy) shareholders in 
an enemy corporation whose assets were seized? In a split decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court answered in the affirmative “not based on any technical 
concept of derivative rights appropriate to the law of corporations,” but 
“based on the [Trading with the Enemy] Act which enables one not an enemy 
as defined in § 2 to recover any interest, right or title which he has in the 
property vested.”61 The dissenting opinion by Justice Reed, in turn, 
denounced the majority’s “disregard of the ordinary incidents of the relation 
of a stockholder to a corporation,” for “[a] stockholder has no present interest 
in the physical property of an unliquidated corporation.”62 
Beyond the early constitutional law and wartime cases, most of the early 
veil peeking controversies dealt with blunt attempts at regulatory arbitrage, 
with parties invoking regulatory partitioning to circumvent certain legal 
restrictions, as examined below. 
C. Early Antitrust and Regulatory Enforcement 
Early antitrust cases produced some of the most conspicuous instances of 
veil peeking as a response to regulatory arbitrage. Take the prominent 
precedent of State v. Standard Oil, decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 
1892.63 In that lawsuit, the state attorney general sought to dissolve the 
Standard Oil Company of Ohio for abusing its franchise in entering into and 
performing a monopolistic trust agreement against public policy.64 The 
Standard Oil Trust was constituted in 1882 to own and control the stocks of 
forty separate competing companies for the benefit of the shareholders of the 
Standard Oil Company of Ohio.65 By 1892, the Standard Oil Trust held the 
stocks of eighty-four companies.66 However, the parties to the trust 
agreement were the shareholders of the companies involved and not the 
companies themselves.67 
 
59 Act of Aug. 5, 1947, ch. 499, sec. 2, § 32(a)(2), 61 Stat. 784, 784-85 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4329(a)(2)(E)). 
60 See infra Part III (describing reverse veil peeking). 
61 Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 343 U.S. 156, 160 (1952); see also Trading with the Enemy 
Act, ch. 106, § 2, 40 Stat. 411, 411 (1917) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4302). 
62 Kaufman, 343 U.S. at 166 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
63 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892). 
64 Id. at 279. 
65 H. L. Wilgus, The Standard Oil Decision; The Rule of Reason, 8 MICH. L. REV. 643, 648 (1911). 
66 Id. 
67 Standard Oil, 30 N.E. at 280. 
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This raised the question of whether the shareholders’ execution of the 
unlawful trust agreement could be attributed to Standard Oil of Ohio to 
punish the company for its unlawfulness.68 Answering in the affirmative, the 
Ohio Supreme Court maintained that corporate separateness, while a useful 
fiction for purposes of asset partitioning and contracting, should be 
disregarded when used for other purposes.69 The court held that 
where all, or a majority, of the stockholders comprising a corporation do an 
act which is designed to affect the property and business of the company . . . 
and the act so done is ultra vires of the corporation and against public policy, 
and was done by them in their individual capacity for the purpose of concealing 
their real purpose and object, the act should be regarded as the act of the 
corporation; and, to prevent the abuse of corporate power, may be challenged 
as such by the state . . . .70 
While the court found that the forfeiture of Standard Oil’s Ohio charter 
was barred by the statute of limitations,71 it engaged in veil peeking to prevent 
the company from making and performing the trust agreement. The Standard 
Oil Trust was then liquidated and the shares were transferred back to the 
several companies, which were later regrouped as the Standard Oil Company 
of New Jersey, a holding company formed under New Jersey’s new liberal 
corporation law.72 It took the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil 
 
68 In Justice Minshall’s words, “the real question we are now to determine is whether . . . the 
execution of the agreement set forth in the petition should be imputed to the association of persons 
constituting the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, acting in their corporate capacity.” Id. at 288. 
69 As the Standard Oil court stated: 
The general proposition that a corporation is to be regarded as a legal entity, existing 
separate and apart from the natural persons composing it, is not disputed; but that the 
statement is a mere fiction, existing only in idea, is well understood, and not 
controverted by any one who pretends to accurate knowledge on the subject. It has 
been introduced for the convenience of the company in making contracts, in acquiring 
property for corporate purposes, in suing and being sued, and to preserve the limited liability of 
the stockholders by distinguishing between the corporate debts and property of the company and 
of the stockholders in their capacity as individuals. All fictions of law have been introduced 
for the purpose of convenience, and to subserve the ends of justice . . . . But when they 
are urged to an intent and purpose not within the reason and policy of the fiction, they 
have always been disregarded by the courts. 
Id. at 287 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. at 289-90. (second emphasis added). 
71 Id. at 291. 
72 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 38-42 (1911) (describing how, 
following the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, Ohio instituted contempt proceedings against the 
Standard Oil Trust for failing to dissolve, only after which the several companies reorganized under 
a holding corporation in New Jersey). 
2021] Veil Peeking 735 
Co. of New Jersey v. United States in 1910, applying the Sherman Antitrust Act 
of 1890, to ultimately break up Standard Oil.73 
The Ohio Standard Oil decision was not unique in mitigating regulatory 
partitioning to ensure the enforcement of competition laws. Two years 
before, New York had also sought to dissolve a company based on illegal trust 
agreements signed by its members. In the leading case of People v. North River 
Sugar Refining Co.,74 the New York Court of Appeals decided to “look beneath 
[the entity] at the actions of the individuals upon whom the franchise was 
conferred” in view of attributing such action to the company.75 These early 
cases are emblematic of the great willingness to look behind the corporate 
veil in the antitrust context—a trend that would prove lasting.76 
Early courts also engaged in veil peeking to punish dummy corporations 
created to evade rate regulations. In United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator 
Transit Co., defendants formed a corporation to conceal their receipt of 
rebates in violation of the rate regulations in the form of rate discrimination 
against other shippers.77 The court found the argument that the corporation 
in question was a separate legal person for purposes of the regulations 
“neither new, nor deserving of new success,”78 holding, as described by 
Maurice Wormser, that “people cannot obtain legal immunity for deliberate 
wrongdoing by a resort to the ‘entity bath.’”79 
D. Jim Crow Discrimination 
The segregationist laws of the Jim Crow era provide a blatant example of 
discriminatory legal treatment across natural persons. In this context, formal 
incorporation by Black corporators as a separate legal person could offer 
regulatory partitioning, and thereby help circumvent some of these odious 
restrictions. The case of People’s Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder involves precisely 
this scenario, in which Major Joseph B. Johnson, who had formerly been 
enslaved, formed a business corporation to avoid the application of a 
restrictive covenant barring the transfer of property to “colored persons.”80 
Despite the obvious attempt to use the corporate form for evading legal 
 
73 Id. at 79. 
74 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890). 
75 Wormser, supra note 12, at 510. 
76 See infra Section VI.B. 
77 See United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 250 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905). 
78 Id. at 256. 
79 Wormser, supra note 12, at 508. As described by Elvin Latty, the court “d[id] not say that a 
corporation is a separate entity—that the stockholders are shut off from legal view” in this particular 
context. Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MICH. L. REV. 597, 602 (1936). 
80 61 S.E. 794, 795-96 (Va. 1908). For an extensive discussion of the case, see Richard R.W. 
Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023 (2006). 
736 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 717 
constraints, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declined to engage in veil 
peeking and did not attribute Johnson’s race to the company. Instead, it held 
that “in law, there can be no such thing as a colored corporation.”81 
In embracing a strict approach of regulatory partitioning by declining to 
attribute a racial identity to the corporation, the People’s Pleasure Park decision 
had the benefits of promoting the civil rights of shareholders and reducing 
the monitoring costs of the corporation’s creditors.82 However, Richard 
Brooks posited that perhaps the fundamental reason why the court refused to 
attribute race to legal person was that “[d]oing so would have revealed the 
unadorned legal construction of race and undermined the political and social 
regime of that period.”83 
Whatever the real reasons for the People’s Pleasure Park decision, the 
“fancied compulsion of the entity concept” is probably not the most 
persuasive.84 At any rate, while veil-peeking claims would continue to appear 
in the context of race-based laws, courts subsequently departed from the strict 
adoption of regulatory partitioning in People’s Pleasure Park.85 
III. VEIL PEEKING VS. VEIL PIERCING 
Before proceeding to examine the economic role of regulatory 
partitioning and its exceptions, as well as the prevalence and range of veil 
peeking claims in contemporary law, I conceptualize and categorize the key 
structural properties of veil peeking. Up until now, scholarly works and 
judicial opinions have consistently conflated veil piercing and veil peeking.86 
Studies focusing on limited liability commonly cite veil peeking precedents 
without ever acknowledging that they do not affect shareholder liability.87 
Existing mentions of the different exceptions to corporate separateness 
are few, perfunctory, and untheorized, which likely helps to explain their 
 
81 Brooks, supra note 80, at 2024 (citation omitted). 
82 See id. at 2046-47 (describing how racializing the corporation would expose “Black” 
corporations and their creditors to greater liability, and how potential creditors would have had to incur 
additional expenses to determine how corporations would be racialized before contracting with them). 
83 Id. at 2047. 
84 See Latty, supra note 79, at 609-10 (arguing that the decision in People’s Pleasure Park should 
have been based on the invalidity of racial covenants, rather than the strict regulatory partitioning 
adopted by the court). 
85 See infra Section VI.A. 
86 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Some decisions, however, make implicit distinctions 
between these modalities. See, e.g., supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
87 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 190-91 (2016) (examining the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006), as a case about reverse veil piercing). For my 
analysis of this case as one of veil peeking, see infra Section VI.0. 
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limited impact.88 German scholarship (and international scholarship building 
on German scholarship)89 offers different labels for the “penetration” of the 
corporate veil for purposes of imposing liability on shareholders 
(Haftungsdurchgriff) and of attributing certain legal characteristics of 
shareholders to the corporation (Zurechnungsdurchgriff), but it does not 
articulate different grounds for, or implications of, these separate categories.90 
A few decisions by U.K. courts in the 1990s have similarly distinguished 
between “piercing the corporate veil” for purposes of liability and “lifting the 
corporate veil” for other legal purposes,91 though this distinction also failed 
to take off.92 Israel’s Companies Law provides the exception that proves the 
rule. While Section 6(a) of the Israeli statute requires fraud or subversion of 
the company’s purpose for the imposition of liability on shareholders (asset 
departitioning), Section 6(b) permits courts to ascribe attributes, rights, or 
obligations of shareholders to the company or vice-versa (regulatory 
departitioning) “if it is just and right to do so, having taken into account the 
intention of the statute or of the agreement that applies to the matter before it.”93 
Yet, despite the prevailing doctrinal confusion in most jurisdictions, the 
differences between veil piercing and veil peeking are clear and numerous. 
This Part endeavors to map these differences and fill the existing gap. 
 
88 For an interesting Italian monograph covering certain manifestations of what the author 
calls “the external relevance of shareholders,” see ALBERTO MUSSO, LA RILEVANZA ESTERNA DEL 
SOCIO NELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI (1996). 
89 See, e.g., CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, O NOVO DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO 259-60 (2011); 2 
JORGE MANUEL COUTINHO DE ABREU, CURSO DE DIREITO COMERCIAL: DAS SOCIEDADES 
174-76 (6th ed. 2019). 
90 The concept of Zurechnungsdurchgriff is similar, though not identical, to the concept of veil 
peeking used here. The distinction between “liability penetration” (Haftungsdurchgriff) and “imputation 
penetration” (Zurechnungsdurchgriff) comes from the work of prominent German corporate law scholar 
HERBERT WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT: EIN LEHRBUCH DES UNTERNEHMENS- UND 
VERBANDSRECHTS (1980). Although pioneering and highly illuminating in labeling the different 
types of exceptions to corporate separateness, Wiedemann’s useful categorization has had limited 
impact on legal scholarship and practice, both in Germany and internationally. 
91 For example, one Justice of the Court of Appeal wrote that 
[l]ike all metaphors, this phrase [the corporate veil] can sometimes obscure reasoning 
rather than elucidate it. There are, I think, two senses in which it is used, which need 
to be distinguished. To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve 
for treating the rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities 
or activities of its shareholders. To lift the corporate veil or look behind it, on the other 
hand, should mean to have regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose. 
Atlas Mar. Co. SA v. Avalon Mar. Ltd. [1990] 4 All ER 769 (AC) at 779 (Staughton LJ). 
92 See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception, 56 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 284 n.2 (1997) (using lifting the corporate veil as a synonym of piercing the 
corporate veil as an exception to limited liability). 
93 Companies Law, 5759–1999, reprinted in COMPANIES LAW 5759-1999 (Aryeh Greenfield 
trans., A.G. Publications 9th ed. 2015). 
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A. Directional and Structural Difference 
As depicted in Figure 1 below, there is a directional and structural 
difference in the operation of veil piercing and veil peeking. Veil piercing 
overcomes limited liability to allow corporate creditors to reach shareholders’ 
assets. Reverse veil piercing, which is rarer, overcomes entity shielding by 
allowing shareholders’ creditors to reach the corporation’s assets. 
Veil peeking, in turn, serves to impute certain legal rights or duties of 
shareholders to the corporation. Reverse veil peeking imputes certain rights 
or features of the corporation to its shareholders, who are allowed to claim 
them in their own name.94 Examples of reverse veil peeking are given by 
corporate law rules requiring the parent company’s shareholders to approve a 
substantial sale of assets by a subsidiary,95 and the international investment 
law regime permitting foreign shareholders to sue host states for the reflective 




94 Scholars have implicitly noted this directional difference. See Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 
17 (discussing “reverse piercing” by corporate insiders). 
95 See infra notes 303–303 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra Section VI.C. 
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Figure 1: Directional Differences Between Veil Piercing and Veil Peeking
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B. Distributional and Ideological Implications 
Veil piercing and veil peeking differ in their distributional implications 
and ideological connotations. Veil piercing has invariably anti-shareholder 
and pro-regulatory consequences, granting creditors remedies that exceed 
those expressly bargained for or imposing liabilities (such as for torts or 
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contrast, may be pro- or anti-shareholder, as well as pro- or anti-regulation, 
depending on whether one looks behind the corporate veil to impute legal 
advantages or detriments to the corporation. 
Veil peeking can be used to level the legal playing field in ways that are 
beneficial or detrimental to shareholder interests compared to the baseline of 
absolute regulatory partitioning. Shareholders may benefit from the 
attribution of free speech, religious, and due process rights to corporations 
on a pass-through basis, all of which can have the effect of frustrating the 
state’s regulatory efforts.97 However, veil peeking can also hurt shareholder 
interests and boost regulation by foreclosing the use of the corporate form to 
evade legal mandates or an unfavorable regulatory regime. 
C. Frequency of Application 
Although veil peeking problems are more circumscribed, they seem to be 
more easily accepted than veil piercing claims. Even jurisdictions that are 
reluctant to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on shareholders, such 
as the United Kingdom, have engaged in veil peeking with some frequency.98 
The greater palatability of veil peeking would not be surprising given the 
nature of the constitutional and regulatory interests involved, as analyzed 
next, as well as the different costs and benefits of asset and regulatory 
partitioning, as examined in Part V below. 
D. Areas of Law 
There is a likely difference in the fields of law giving rise to most veil 
piercing and veil peeking claims. Veil piercing claims seem to be more 
common in private law disputes concerning contract and tort law claims, 
while veil peeking cases frequently appear in public law cases testing the 
permissibility of legal discrimination by the state, or tackling parties’ 
 
97 Admittedly, the attribution of free speech and religious rights to corporations may increase 
agency costs between shareholders and managers (or among shareholders) having different views of 
beliefs. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
98 In fact, the recent reconceptualization of veil piercing by the U.K. Supreme Court is in large 
part about veil peeking. According to the court, the U.K. jurisprudence on veil piercing can be 
explained in terms of what Lord Sumption termed the “concealment principle” and the “evasion 
principle,” both of which are often about peeking, not piercing. Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] 
UKSC 34, [28] (Lord Sumption SCJ) (appeal taken from Eng.). The United Kingdom is also a 
leader in the global movement toward public disclosure of beneficial ownership, which supports veil 
peeking as well as veil piercing. See JOHN GITHONGO, BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: THE GLOBAL 
STATE OF PLAY 2019, at 3-4 (2019), 
https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/beneficial_ownership_githongo_final_july_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8Y3G-3U63] (describing a 2009 scandal in Britain and subsequent initiatives by 
the British government to increase ownership transparency). 
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attempts at regulatory arbitrage, often emerging in constitutional, antitrust, 
regulatory, tax, or international law disputes. 
Nevertheless, the correlation between veil piercing and veil peeking and 
areas of private and public law is far from absolute. Numerous public law 
rules and regulations are enforced by financial penalties to be satisfied against 
an entity’s assets. Veil piercing as an exception to asset partitioning can and 
does often appear in connection with regulatory claims and criminal law, as 
when the state goes after the assets of a parent company to sanction violations 
of environmental laws by a subsidiary.99 Conversely, as further illustrated 
below, veil peeking also applies in private law as a gap-filling method to avoid 
the circumvention of contract, property, and corporate law rules. 
E. Different Boundaries 
As different functional phenomena, veil piercing and veil peeking are 
subject to distinct boundaries. Regulatory partitioning itself is also subject to 
different boundaries across legal fields and rules, a phenomenon that also 
holds to a lesser extent for asset partitioning. This means that the imposition 
of liability on corporate shareholders in a given veil piercing case does not 
necessarily put an end to regulatory partitioning (or asset partitioning, for 
that matter) in other areas of law, such as tax and jurisdictional matters. 
Conversely, the use of veil peeking in a certain regulatory context does not 
compromise asset partitioning or regulatory partitioning across the board. 
Furthermore, contrary to existing assumptions, there appears to be no 
necessary correlation between courts’ general willingness to engage in veil 
piercing and veil peeking.100 Veil piercing and veil peeking provide exceptions 
to distinct components of corporate separateness and are treated differently by 
courts. If anything, there might be a reverse relationship between a given court’s 
willingness to engage in veil piercing and shareholder-friendly veil peeking. 
U.S. courts have repeatedly engaged in veil peeking to attribute 
constitutional rights to corporations but generally have been reluctant to 
impinge on limited liability by piercing the corporate veil. Commentators 
have pointed to a contradiction in this approach,101 but the tension is only 
apparent. The reluctance to engage in veil piercing and the willingness to 
 
99 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 1058 n.117 (describing the incidence of veil piercing in the 
context of criminal law and regulatory law); Macey & Mitts, supra note 4, at 115 (finding that veil 
piercing is particularly common to uphold the purpose of a regulatory or statutory scheme, as when 
courts impose liabilities on parent companies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)). 
100 Some commentators have posited such a connection. Macey & Strine, supra note 14, at 42 
(warning about the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court veil peeking decision in Citizens United 
for the concept of limited liability). 
101 See, e.g., id. 
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engage in veil peeking to attribute shareholder rights to the corporation are 
consistent in their pro-shareholder and anti-regulatory orientation. 
Contrast this to Brazilian law, which has adopted an exceptionally 
expansive approach to veil piercing, effectively eliminating the protection of 
limited liability with respect to labor, environmental, and consumer claims.102 
At the same time, the Brazilian Supreme Court has been reluctant to attribute 
constitutional rights to corporations through veil peeking. In 2015, it found 
that the existing statute permitting campaign contributions from legal 
persons was unconstitutional as a violation of the general principles of 
equality and democracy.103 This decision stands in contrast to the U.S. 
Supreme Court stance in Citizens United v. FEC,104 which recognizes 
corporations’ free speech rights to make independent campaign expenditures. 
IV. UNPACKING VEIL PEEKING 
This Part scrutinizes the different forms of veil peeking by mapping out 
the main functions performed by veil peeking and offering a taxonomy of its 
different modalities. This effort will reveal that, although sufficiently 
distinctive as a category, veil peeking is not a unitary phenomenon. This 
categorization of different veil peeking strategies will have repercussions for 
the economic analysis of regulatory partitioning and veil peeking, as 
presented in the following section. 
A. The Types of Veil Peeking Problems 
Veil peeking questions concern one of three related problems: 
1. The Problem of Permissible Regulatory Differentiation 
The question here is whether individuals and legal persons (or different 
types of legal persons) ought to be subject to the same or different legal 
regime. Prominent examples include the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, which is credited for 
concluding that the disparate tax treatment afforded to railroad corporations 
 
102 Mariana Pargendler, How Universal Is the Corporate Form? Reflections on the Dwindling of 
Corporate Attributes in Brazil, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 4 (2019). 
103 S.T.F., Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 4.650, Realtor: Min. Luiz Fux, 17.09.2015, 
http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/downloadPeca.asp?id=308746530&ext=.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEQ5-
M9B6]. The Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) decision concerns campaign contributions rather than 
independent political expenditures as does Citizens United. In fact, the STF opinion mentions 
Citizens United but distinguishes its decision by referring to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424. U.S. 1, 22 (1976), which differentiates the protection of campaign contribution 
and political expenditures on First Amendment grounds. 
104 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
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in California compared to individual landowners violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,105 and 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
which held the corporate identity of the speaker did not affect its protection 
under the First Amendment.106 
2. The Problem of Permissible Regulatory Arbitrage 
The issue here pertains to the legality of using the corporate form to evade 
or modify existing legal restrictions. Examples include the formation of a 
corporation by a Black founder to evade the racial covenants in People 
Pleasure’s Park,107 the transfer of real property to a wholly owned corporation 
to avoid homestead exemptions against creditors,108 and the incorporation in 
a foreign jurisdiction covered by a bilateral investment treaty to obtain 
enhanced legal protection against one’s home state.109 
3. The Problem of Aggregation and Pass-Through Imputation 
This problem concerns whether and how certain rights, duties or qualities 
of shareholders that are subject to disparate legal treatment should be 
imputed to the legal persons owned or controlled by them. Examples include 
the imputation of enemy character of shareholders or managers to the 
corporation for purposes of the application of wartime restrictions.110 
Although analytically distinct, these problems are interrelated. While the 
first problem relates to the permissibility of regulatory differentiation, the 
latter two emerge only when the legal regime effectively distinguishes 
between the legal status of different natural persons, of natural persons and 
legal persons, or of different legal persons. Regulatory arbitrage always 
presupposes the existence of regulatory differentiation. Pass-through 
imputation at times presupposes the existence of regulatory differentiation 
and at times determines whether such regulatory differentiation is 
permissible. 
 
105 118 U.S. 394, 394-95 (1886). But see infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text (for the 
controversy surrounding the holding of Santa Clara due to the misleading syllabus). 
106 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). While veil peeking often pertains to the problem of permissible 
regulatory differentiation across different organizational forms, not all questions of regulatory 
differentiation concern veil peeking. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405, 1408 
(2018) (holding that, unlike foreign individuals, foreign corporations may not be sued under the 
Alien Tort Statute in the absence of clear congressional instructions). 
107 See supra Section II.D. 
108 See infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra Section II.B. 
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B. A Taxonomy of Veil Peeking 
For each of the problems outlined above, there can be different forms of 
veil peeking or regulatory partitioning responses. 
1. Explicit Veil Peeking by Lawmakers vs. Judicial Veil Peeking as Gap 
Filling 
The first and most fundamental distinction concerns the source of veil 
peeking. Veil peeking may be the result of the explicit language of the 
constitution, statute, treaty, or contract in question (lawmaker veil peeking), 
or it might be the product of a judicial determination when the legal source 
in question does not provide an explicit solution for the classical veil-peeking 
problems (judicial veil peeking). Explicit veil peeking by lawmakers is 
commonplace. A few examples include tax rules that condition the applicable 
regime on the identity of shareholders in the corporation, the corporate law 
requirement that shareholders of the parent company approve asset sales 
conducted by a subsidiary, and the statutory imposition of enemy treatment 
on corporations that are fifty percent enemy owned or controlled under the 
amended Trading with the Enemy Act.111 
Most veil peeking controversies, however, relate to situations in which the 
legal text in question is not explicit about (1) the permissibility of regulatory 
differentiation, (2) the permissibility of regulatory arbitrage, or (3) the 
criterion for aggregation or pass-through imputation. This means that veil-
peeking controversies, including the ones examined here, are essentially about 
interpretation or gap filling of constitutional, statutory, treaty, or contractual 
texts that do not explicitly address the treatment of corporate entities. As a 
question of constitutional, statutory, treaty, or contractual construction, the 
standard tenets of interpretation apply, and the purpose of the regulatory 
scheme in question assumes major importance. 
2. Shareholder-Friendly vs. Shareholder-Unfriendly Veil Peeking 
Veil peeking can also be categorized according to its effects. Shareholder-
friendly veil peeking restricts the scope of government intervention on 
corporations by permitting the assertion of shareholder rights against the 
state. Shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking magnifies the regulatory power of 
the state over business corporations by preventing regulatory arbitrage, or 
ascribing to corporations some of the regulatory constraints applicable to the 
individuals that control them. 
 
111 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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Shareholder-friendly veil peeking increases the attractiveness of the 
corporate form, while shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking reduces it. 
Shareholder-friendly veil peeking generally limits the state’s power, and 
shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking generally augments it. There are, 
however, exceptions to this pattern. The opposite result holds when the state 
itself is a shareholder—as in a citizen’s free-speech lawsuit against 
government-owned railroad company Amtrak112—so that shareholder-
unfriendly veil peeking reduces state power, but also decreases the 
attractiveness of the corporate form to the state. The use of veil peeking to 
permit corporations to raise antidiscrimination claims, as examined below, 
simultaneously enhances the state’s regulatory power and favors shareholder 
interests, thereby increasing the attractiveness of the corporate form. 
Indeed, both veil peeking and the strict upholding of regulatory 
partitioning can promote shareholder-friendly and shareholder-unfriendly 
outcomes, depending on the question at issue. Take, for instance, the 
interaction between race and regulatory partitioning. The strict regulatory 
partitioning commitment to “colorless corporations” in the face of racial 
covenants was clearly shareholder friendly,113 as is the veil peeking approach 
permitting corporations to claim a racial identity for the purposes of 
antidiscrimination laws.114 
3. Untailored (Categorical) vs. Tailored Veil Peeking 
Veil peeking can be implemented in a categorical or tailored fashion.115 
Veil peeking is categorical when the relevant decision about regulatory 
partitioning is made without regard to the characteristics of the corporation 
in question. Tailored veil peeking occurs when the imputation of rights or 
characteristics to the corporation takes into account the particular ownership 
structure of the corporation or other case-specific factors. Tailored approaches 
to veil peeking can take place through legal rules (e.g., depending on non-
profit vs. for-profit status or the ownership of a certain percentage of voting 
shares) or standards (such as the existence of corporate control). In the choice 
 
112 See infra notes 283–87 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra Section II.B. 
114 See infra Section V.0. 
115 This categorization draws loosely on Ayres and Gertner’s seminal work on default rules in 
contract law, which distinguishes between “tailored” defaults (which aims to apply the rule that the 
parties before the court would have wanted), “untailored” defaults (which applies the regime that 
most parties would have wanted), and “penalty” default rules (which provide a regime that the 
parties would not have contracted for). See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
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between rule-based or standard-based tailoring, the familiar tradeoffs 
between rules and standards apply.116 
The famous syllabus of Santa Clara, stating that corporations are persons 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment as a form of protection for the 
rights of individuals, is an instance of categorical veil peeking.117 So is the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Copperweld holding that a parent and a 
wholly owned subsidiary do not count as separate entities for purposes of a 
conspiracy under the Sherman Act.118 Although the categorical recognition of 
regulatory partitioning is well known—as in the commitment to “colorless 
corporations” in People’s Pleasure Park119—or in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
refusal to extend the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
to corporations120—scholars, practitioners, and courts often do not appreciate 
the broad use of categorical veil peeking.121 
A key question in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dole Food Co. v. 
Patrickson122 was whether a company indirectly owned by the Israeli 
government through intermediate corporate entities qualified as an 
instrumentality of the state for purpose of federal jurisdiction under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). The FSIA grants 
instrumentality status to an entity “a majority of whose shares or other 
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof.”123 In declining to find federal jurisdiction, the unanimous opinion, 
written by Justice Kennedy, noted that “[t]he doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil . . . is the rare exception, applied in the case of fraud or certain 
exceptional circumstances” and “usually determined on a case-by-case 
basis.”124 It added that the companies had “no authority for extending the 
doctrine so far that, as a categorical matter, all subsidiaries are deemed to be 
the same as the parent corporation.”125 Yet the very jurisprudence of the 
 
116 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557 
(1992) (explaining how legal rules are more costly to create while standards are more costly to 
interpret); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592 (1988) 
(distinguishing rules from standards by describing how rules allow malicious actors to act within the 
acceptable yet harmful limits on their conduct). 
117 See infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text. 
118 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777; see also infra Section VI.0. 
119 See supra Section II.D. 
120 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 57 (1906). 
121 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 12, at 1200 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s attribution of 
shareholders’ constitutional rights to corporations as “a radical departure from the Court’s treatment 
of corporations in all other areas of law”). 
122 538 U.S. 468, 471 (2003). 
123 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). 
124 Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 475. 
125 Id. at 475-76 (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court recognizes several instances of categorical veil peeking in 
other contexts.126 
Conversely, factual inquiries into control structures in Daimler and Standard 
Oil of Ohio reflect a tailored approach to veil peeking. However, the distinction 
between tailored and untailored approaches to veil peeking do not represent a 
sharp dichotomy, but rather a continuum of approaches that are more or less 
tailored. This is well illustrated by the analysis of the prominent (if 
controversial) decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC.127 
In that case, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to release 
and publicize a documentary critical of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton 
through video-on-demand.128 The issue was whether a federal statutory rule 
prohibiting unions and corporations from making certain political 
expenditures constituted a violation of the guarantee of freedom of speech 
contained in the First Amendment of the Constitution.129 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion deemed the statutory restrictions 
unconstitutional based on (1) the unconstitutionality of restrictions based on 
the identity of the speaker, as the text of the First Amendment refers to 
“speech,”130 and (2) the pass-through imputation on a categorical basis of 
citizens’ rights to corporations, which are described as “associations of 
citizens.”131 In my taxonomy, the Court’s majority opinion engages in judicial 
gap filling to embrace shareholder-friendly veil peeking on a categorical basis, 
thereby forbidding regulatory differentiation to the detriment of corporations 
as a whole.132 
The dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, by contrast, sought to sanction 
regulatory differentiation between the rights of humans and artificial entities 
by preserving regulatory partitioning.133 It endorsed the different treatment 
 
126 See, e.g., supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text; infra note 251 and accompanying text 
(presenting examples of court cases in which the Supreme Court employed a categorical approach 
to veil peeking). 
127 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
128 Id. at 319-20. 
129 Id. at 321. 
130 See id. at 341 (“The First Amendment protects speech and the speaker, and the ideas that 
flow from each.”). 
131 Id. at 356 
132 As one scholar described it, “[t]he change [in Citizens United] was that the Court rejected 
the taxonomy-based approach distinguishing among organizations” and “abandoned the nuanced 
approach involving the application of narrow tailoring and compelling state interest law that had 
developed over the prior decades.” Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 118 (2014). 
133 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Unlike our colleagues, [the Framers] had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human 
beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was 
the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind.”). 
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of corporate political expenditures given that “[i]n the context of election to 
public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is 
significant.”134 Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Citizens 
United are categorical in that they do not condition veil peeking or regulatory 
partitioning on the particular characteristics of the legal person in question, 
in terms of ownership structure or for-profit versus non-profit status, among 
other factors. 
Scholars such as Margaret Blair and Elizabeth Pollman have advocated 
precisely such a tailored peeking approach that distinguishes between 
organizational forms of for-profit and not-for-profit corporations, as well as 
between firms with different ownership structures.135 In defending such a 
tailored approach, they suggest that, in view of the derivative nature of 
corporate constitutional rights, it is imperative “to identify the specific group 
of natural persons from whom the corporate right is derived,” so that 
categorical, “[b]road rulings as to all corporations do not suffice.”136 Despite 
certain potential advantages, however, such a tailored veil-peeking approach 
generates obvious difficulties of line drawing, as its supporters concede.137 
In any case, the distinction between tailored and categorical approaches 
to veil peeking is not rigidly binary, but rather part of a spectrum. Even the 
majority opinion in Citizens United acknowledged the potential need for 
subsequent tailoring of veil peeking to constrain foreign interference in 
elections.138 It refused, however, to categorically embrace regulatory 
 
134 Garrett, supra note 132, at 118. 
135 Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1733 (2015) (“[F]or some purposes, some corporations can usefully 
and functionally be regarded as aggregates of their members from whom rights could be derived, 
while other corporations serve other purposes, and cannot be regarded as representing any particular 
natural person or group of natural persons.”). 
136 Id. at 1735. 
137 See id. at 1738; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Line Drawing in Corporate Rights Determinations, 
65 DEPAUL L. REV. 597, 600-02 (2016) (discussing why the diversity in corporate organizations is 
grounds for a tailored approach to determining corporate rights); Margaret M. Blair, Corporations 
and Expressive Rights: How the Lines Should Be Drawn, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 253-54 (2016) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should clearly define corporate rights for specific types of 
organizations). 
138 Justice Kennedy wrote: 
We need not reach the question whether the Government has a compelling interest in 
preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political 
process . . . . Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if we assumed, arguendo, 
that the Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our 
political process. 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1046 (suggesting that future efforts to regulate campaign expenditures by 
foreign corporations will likely rely on the locus of corporate management control, rather than on 
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partitioning as a solution to this problem, as proposed by Justice Stevens in 
his dissenting opinion.139 
V. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF REGULATORY PARTITIONING AND 
VEIL PEEKING 
Asset (de)partitioning and regulatory (de)partitioning serve 
fundamentally different functions and entail distinct tradeoffs. While the 
literature provides ready answers regarding the economic properties of asset 
partitioning and veil piercing, it has thus far ignored the role of regulatory 
partitioning and veil peeking. Up until now, regulatory partitioning had not 
been explicitly identified, much less theorized. This Part first examines the 
economic benefits and costs of regulatory partitioning and how they differ 
from those of asset partitioning. It then offers guidance to courts in 
adjudicating veil peeking controversies. 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Asset and Regulatory (De)partitioning 
Asset partitioning in the form of limited liability and entity shielding 
offers several benefits, which veil piercing and reverse veil piercing then 
potentially compromise. By limiting shareholders’ economic exposure, 
limited liability (1) reduces monitoring costs of shareholders and creditors, 
(2) encourages delegated management and thereby promotes diversification, 
and (3) facilitates share tradability, liquidity, and the market for corporate 
control by permitting shares to be priced irrespective of the identity of their 
owners. Entity shielding, which is compromised by reverse veil piercing, 
helps (4) preserve going concern value, (5) facilitate bankruptcy 
administration, and (6) correct debt overhang. At the same time, however, 
asset partitioning produces two new forms of costs: (1) an increased agency 
cost of debt and (2) higher accounting costs.140 
 
the nationality of the majority of shareholders, for “the same reasons that forced the Court to 
abandon the aggregate view for diversity jurisdiction”). 
139 Justice Stevens wrote: 
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the identity of a speaker has no 
relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate political speech would lead to some 
remarkable conclusions. Such an assumption would have accorded the propaganda 
broadcasts to our troops by “Tokyo Rose” during World War II the same protection 
as speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would appear to afford the same 
protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual 
Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could “‘enhance the relative voice’” of some (i. 
e., humans) over others (i. e., nonhumans). 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. 
at 379-80 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
140 See Hansmann & Squire, supra note 2, at 266 tbl. 11.1. 
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Compared to veil piercing, veil peeking compromises only a fraction of 
the benefits of asset partitioning listed above and, even so, only to a limited 
extent. Because veil piercing does not influence asset partitioning, it does not 
at all affect going concern value, the ease of bankruptcy administration, and 
the solutions to debt overhang as important advantages of asset partitioning. 
Nor does it mitigate, for that matter, the costs of asset partitioning. 
Regulatory partitioning does share with asset partitioning the key benefit 
of promoting share transferability, liquidity, and the market for corporate 
control. By isolating the legal regime applicable to the corporation from the 
identity and regulatory status of its shareholders, it permits corporations to 
be valued and shares to be priced irrespective of shareholder identity. Just like 
a regime of unlimited liability conditions the value of corporate shares on the 
wealth of shareholders, veil peeking conditions the value of the firm on 
certain regulatory advantages or drawbacks triggered by the identity of 
shareholders.141 Veil peeking can thereby discourage control transfers that 
could be optimal from an agency cost or industrial organization perspective. 
While some forms of veil peeking intentionally seek to restrict share 
transfers, as in nationality and foreign ownership restrictions, in other 
contexts reduced transferability is an accidental byproduct of veil peeking.142 
Crucially, regulatory partitioning also carries benefits and costs that are 
distinct from those of asset partitioning. In upholding the separation between 
the legal spheres of the corporation and its non-controlling shareholders, 
regulatory partitioning is essential for the proper functioning of enterprises 
with numerous and changing members. The corporation is prima facie 
shielded from the variety of legal obligations and disabilities affecting its 
shareholders, from non-compete obligations and disqualification from 
government contracts to international sanctions. By contributing to the 
stability and foreseeability of the legal regime applicable to the corporate 
entity, this form of regulatory shielding with respect to non-controlling 
 
141 A related argument is that unlimited liability hampers share transferability. See Paul 
Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 130 (1980) (positing that, in the absence of limited 
liability, the purchase price of equity securities would depend on the wealth of shareholders); FRANK 
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
42 (1991) (observing the same). However, there are important differences in the ways veil piercing 
and veil peeking impinge on share pricing and transferability. Veil piercing reduces the price wealthy 
shareholders are willing to pay for corporate shares, but it does not affect shareholders who are 
judgment proof or the operation of the corporation itself other than by increasing its cost of capital. 
By contrast, veil peeking can easily affect the status and operation of the firm for the detriment or 
benefit of all shareholders. 
142 Consider, for instance, how the legal regime established in the COMILOG case may deter 
control transfers to parent companies located in more developed jurisdictions. See infra notes 249–
50 and accompanying text (discussing the COMILOG case finding jurisdiction in France for 
unlawful conduct in Congo after control of the Congolese company was transferred to a French company). 
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shareholders is as fundamental to the viability of firms with numerous 
shareholders as entity shielding.143 
Precisely for this reason, the actual operation of veil peeking is invariably 
premised not on the ownership of a single share or minority stake in a 
corporation, but on the existence of corporate control.144 Just as veil piercing 
is not used to reach the assets of a corporation’s workers, consumers, creditors, 
or minority shareholders,145 veil peeking applies exclusively vis-à-vis 
controlling shareholders or, less frequently, top managers. While scholars 
have questioned the choice of shareholders as the relevant target for veil 
peeking,146 the relationship between veil peeking and corporate control is 
remarkably strong and for good functional reasons. Corporate control 
effectively blurs the boundaries of the firm.147 
Although less existential, the upholding of regulatory partitioning vis-à-
vis controlling shareholders also offers important benefits. Importantly, it 
reduces regulatory costs, since control-based regulations can be costly to 
implement. Not only do they hinder share transferability as a key attribute of 
the corporate form, as discussed above, but adjudicating control begets legal 
mud. Corporate control is a key legal and economic concept that is 
exceptionally difficult to define ex ante and can also be quite costly to verify 
ex post.148 
 
143 For the key economic role of entity shielding (or affirmative asset partitioning), see 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 390; Hansmann et al., supra note 1, at 1336. 
144 The exception is categorical shareholder-friendly veil peeking which levels the 
organizational playing field by attributing fundamental rights to corporations. 
145 See, e.g., Pargendler, supra note 102, at 22 (describing how Brazilian labor courts often pierce 
the corporate veil to hold minority shareholders liable for corporate obligations). 
146 See Blair & Pollman, supra note 135, at 1730 (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Hobby Lobby for not explaining “why the shareholders were the appropriate persons from whom to 
derive a religious exemption from an employee health benefit requirement for the corporation, 
despite one of the corporations involved having more than 13,000 employees, whose religious beliefs 
were not considered”). 
147 See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
148 The continued expansion of the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS) to review transactions that could pose a threat to national security 
illustrates the difficulties in defining control. Following the changes introduced by the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), CFIUS review now encompasses 
not only controlling stakes but also “[o]ther investments” that give foreign persons access to material 
technical information, board membership, or observer rights or involvement in substantive decision-
making in connection with critical infrastructure, critical technology, or sensitive personal data. 50 
U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D). Another fundamental difficulty is that control may to some extent take 
place through means other than stock ownership, which could help defeat veil peeking inquiries. See, 
e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 307 (Del. 2015) (finding that a contractual 
management agreement that limits a corporation’s strategic options does not characterize control in 
the absence of significant stock ownership and voting power). Interestingly, Chinese firms have 
channeled massive foreign investment through contractual (rather than equity) rights in “variable 
interest entities” (VIEs) holding operating licenses and other sensitive assets—a structure aimed at 
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Existing attempts to create rule-based definitions of control—such as 
linking it to the holding of a majority of the voting stock or of a certain 
threshold of shares—can be easily over- or underinclusive in identifying 
actual instances of corporate control. On the other hand, the type of open-
ended inquiry into actual corporate control can be costly, unpredictable, and 
prone to error. This is one reason why corporate law rules are often not 
tailored to ownership and control structure, even though scholars seem to 
agree that firms with different ownership structures are best served by 
different corporate law regimes.149 
The high cost of open-ended control inquiries is also a key reason why the 
law so often refuses to peek despite the importance of corporate control, 
resorting instead to objective criteria for the attribution of legal 
consequences, such as the principal place of business or place of 
incorporation. In other words: because control inquiries are costly, they are 
used only when the stakes are high, control inherently matters to accomplish 
the regulatory objective, and the legal problems in question are not routine. 
For routine matters, veil peeking is eschewed in favor of more objective 
criteria. Conversely, veil peeking is often used when the regulatory question 
at hand is both non-routine and consequential, as in antitrust and national 
security matters.150 
Despite its benefits, regulatory partitioning can also be costly in 
frustrating the state’s regulatory efforts. Precisely because the corporation 
serves as a separate nexus for regulation, it operates as a chief instrument for 
purposes of regulatory arbitrage.151 This means that the essential tradeoff 
between regulatory partitioning and veil peeking relates to the benefits of 
reducing regulatory costs and facilitating share transfers, on the one hand, 
and the potential harm to regulatory effectiveness, on the other. 
 
circumventing Chinese regulations that restrict foreign investment in certain industries through veil 
peeking. See Schumpeter, A Legal Vulnerability at the Heart of China’s Big Internet Firms, THE 
ECONOMIST (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/09/16/a-legal-vulnerability-
at-the-heart-of-chinas-big-internet-firms [https://perma.cc/8X8T-BSP8] (discussing the use of VIEs 
to own assets in “politically sensitive sectors” of China’s economy). 
149 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance 
Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1280 (2009) (arguing there are different corporate governance 
best practices for companies with concentrated and dispersed ownership structures). 
150 For examples, see supra Section II.B (national security during wartime) and infra Section 
VI.B (antitrust). 
151 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010) (outlining a 
theory of regulatory arbitrage that reveals how it ultimately “undermines the rule of law”); Frank 
Partnoy, The Law of Two Prices: Regulatory Arbitrage Revisited, 107 GEO. L.J. 1017, 1018-19 (2019) 
(arguing that regulatory arbitrage warrants caution because, unlike financial arbitrage, it can lead to 
the persistence of different prices for economically equivalent transactions). To be sure, the use of 
the corporate form for purposes of regulatory arbitrage can at times lead to results that are both fair 
and efficient, as in the recognition of “colorless corporations” in People’s Pleasure Park. See supra Section II.D. 
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Nevertheless, because veil peeking is not a unitary phenomenon, its 
precise effects will depend on the modality involved. Tailored veil peeking is 
both costlier to apply and potentially more disruptive to share transferability 
than categorical veil peeking, though—as the name suggests—more tailored 
to the realization of the regulatory objectives in a particular case. Categorical 
veil peeking that levels the organizational playing field by attributing 
fundamental rights to all corporations, as in Citizens United, is easy to 
adjudicate and does not hinder share transferability in a meaningful way. 
Although various commentators have chastised the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United as insufficiently tailored,152 the categorical 
approach has the overlooked benefit of achieving organizational neutrality 
and promoting share transferability.153 However, even fairly categorical veil 
peeking rules, as in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision, holding 
there can be no antitrust conspiracy between a parent and a wholly owned 
subsidiary,154 can discourage share transferability by muddying the legal 
regime applicable to partial subsidiaries. 
Shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking may increase monitoring costs by 
shareholders and creditors. By linking a corporation’s regulatory status to the 
composition of its shareholder base, shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking 
increases regulatory risk and makes it more difficult to evaluate it. In a world 
where veil peeking is permitted, non-controlling shareholders and creditors 
must worry about legal disadvantages stemming from the status of controlling 
shareholders. To be sure, non-controlling shareholders and creditors can and 
do, to some extent, protect themselves by contracting for change-of-control 
provisions in credit agreements,155 or through share transfer restrictions and 
tag-along rights in corporate charters or shareholder agreements.156 These 
 
152 See, e.g., Blair & Pollman, supra note 135, at 1733; Randall P. Benzanson, No Middle Ground? 
Reflections on the Citizens United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 652-53 (2011) (contending that the 
Court could and should have reached a narrower holding based on the characteristics of the 
organization in question). 
153 For an account of the constitutional jurisprudence on corporate rights in terms of 
organizational neutrality, see Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 499, 503 (2016), which argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s seemingly inconsistent 
approach to questions concerning the nature of the firm are actually unified in a theory of 
organizational neutrality, which “stands for the idea that the burden of actual or potential regulation 
should not affect the mode of organization through which entrepreneurs choose to coordinate group activity.” 
154 See infra Section VI.B. 
155 See, e.g., Ningzhong Li, Yun Lou & Florin P. Vasvari, Default Clauses in Debt Contracts, 20 
REV. ACCT. STUD. 1596, 1609 (2015) (finding that a change in control constitutes an event of default 
in seventy-one percent of loan agreements in their sample). 
156 See, e.g., XAVIER RUIZ & MARTA GARCIA, IBA GUIDE ON SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS 
(DELAWARE, NEW YORK AND FLORIDA, USA) 4 (2018), https://perma.cc/C22L-NPDQ (referring 
the lawful use of transfer restrictions and tag-along rights in shareholder agreements). 
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protections, however, often come at the cost of decreased liquidity and 
potentially higher agency costs.157 
Moreover, even categorical veil peeking that is beneficial to shareholders 
may at times increase agency costs. This argument has been raised in the context 
of the Citizens United decision, since heterogeneous, welfare-maximizing 
shareholders may not uniformly favor a given firm’s political contributions. 
There are, however, less drastic corporate law solutions to this problem beyond 
banning veil peeking, assuming they were constitutionally permissible.158 
Importantly, the magnitude of liquidity, monitoring, and agency costs 
raised by veil peeking is likely much lower than that of veil piercing. This is 
because (1) the legal scenarios leading to detrimental veil peeking are 
relatively circumscribed and (2) such regulatory risk may be a second-order 
consideration compared to the first-order credit risk and related monitoring 
costs that exist in the absence of asset partitioning. 
To put it differently: it is one thing to risk having a corporation exposed 
to an undesirable rule or regulation. It is quite another to have one’s entire 
wealth at risk due to corporate obligations which could ensue in the absence 
of limited liability, or to have the corporation at risk because of individual 
shareholder debts, which could ensue in the absence of entity shielding. Veil 
piercing relates to credit risk, which is all-encompassing. Veil peeking 
pertains only to some forms of regulatory risk, at times reducing it 
(shareholder-friendly veil peeking) and at times increasing it (shareholder-
unfriendly veil peeking). 
One peculiarity is that shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking can harm 
innocent, non-controlling shareholders via the imputation of legal detriments 
to the corporation based on the actions or identity of the controlling 
shareholders. This contrasts with veil piercing, where the imposition of 
liability for corporate obligations can, and usually does, affect only controlling 
shareholders. This means that ownership structure should matter more for 
veil peeking than for veil piercing, since the latter can more easily leave 
 
157 All of these mechanisms operate as entrenchment devices that can hamper the transfer of 
control to more effective managers, thereby enhancing agency costs. For the economic tradeoffs 
associated with tag-along rights that grant minority shareholders the right to sell in a sale-of-control 
transaction, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 
109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 960 (1994), which explains how premium-sharing rules can block efficient as 
well as inefficient control transfers. 
158 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comment, Corporate Political Speech: 
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 97-111 (2010) (discussing how special corporate rules could 
remedy the interest divergence between management and shareholders on decisions related to 
corporate political speech and addressing the associated constitutional concerns). 
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minority shareholders unscathed.159 All else being equal, the case for veil 
peeking is generally far stronger with respect to closely held corporations 
compared to widely held firms, and stronger still with respect to wholly 
owned or nearly wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Shareholder-friendly veil peeking, by contrast, increases the attractiveness 
of the corporate form to entrepreneurs. In its absence, entrepreneurs would 
need to trade off the economic benefits associated with the corporate 
attributes against a disfavored regulatory treatment imposed on the corporate 
form. By foreclosing regulatory differentiation between natural persons and 
corporations, or between corporations and other organizational forms, 
shareholder-friendly veil peeking eliminates this tradeoff and encourages 
incorporation. 
Finally, reverse veil peeking involves distinct costs and benefits. Take, for 
instance, the regime allowing shareholders to claim in their own name 
compensation for losses suffered by the corporation. Contrary to existing 
critiques,160 reverse veil peeking of this kind is shareholder friendly; it does 
not compromise the economic benefits of asset partitioning, since the 
shareholder’s claim is filed against a third-party and not the corporation. 
This form of reverse veil peeking appears to be useful precisely when, for 
imputation reasons, the corporation is prevented from exercising its rights. A 
classic scenario is when a foreign-owned, but locally-incorporated company, 
is the victim of expropriation by a host state.161 However, reverse veil peeking 
also creates the risk of duplication in claims and double recovery when both 
the corporation and foreign investors are allowed to sue host states.162 Other 
forms of reverse veil peeking, as in the attribution of shareholder approval 
rights at the parent level for transactions carried out by subsidiaries, appear 
to be less detrimental, at most posing difficulties of line drawing. 
B. Criteria for the Application of Veil Peeking 
Veil piercing doctrine is muddy and notoriously indeterminate. The 
literature typically cites several factors that courts supposedly take into 
account when deciding to pierce the corporate veil and render shareholders 
liable for corporate obligations, including undercapitalization, commingling 
of assets, the failure to observe corporate formalities, unity of interest, fraud, 
 
159 Scholars have similarly argued that asset partitioning provides fewer benefits in the context 
of wholly owned subsidiaries. See, e.g., Hansmann & Squire, supra note 2, at 266 tbl. 11.1 (listing the 
reduced benefits of internal asset partitioning). 
160 See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
162 See Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 37 (2019) (“Tribunals’ tendency to view corporate claims and claims by discrete shareholders as 
completely independent raises two specters: double recovery and multiple bites at the apple.”). 
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and the operation of the company as the “alter ego” of shareholders, among 
others.163 Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts have questioned whether these 
oft-repeated factors accurately describe the criteria used by courts. Their 
empirical study suggests that, in practice, veil piercing is used to achieve three 
different statutory objectives that are consistent with efficiency: (1) realizing 
the purpose of a statute or regulation; (2) avoiding misrepresentation by 
shareholders; and (3) avoiding favoritism and maximizing firm value in the 
bankruptcy context.164 
Following the current state of the doctrinal literature, existing empirical 
studies do not distinguish between veil piercing and veil peeking.165 A 
systematic mapping of the criteria used in veil peeking cases—and how they 
differ from veil piercing cases—would therefore require further research. The 
existing conflation between veil piercing and veil peeking is arguably one 
reason why veil piercing doctrine is so muddled. 
Both logic and some of the actual cases examined throughout this Article 
suggest that veil peeking at times is, as it should be, subject to different 
criteria from veil piercing.166 Nevertheless, it also appears that courts and 
scholars frequently err in applying restrictive veil piercing criteria for veil 
peeking claims,167 which is understandable given the prevailing doctrinal 
conflation. The time has come to distinguish the relevant criteria for veil 
piercing and veil peeking disputes. 
While factors such as commingling of assets and fraud are relevant for 
veil piercing, they should not be required for veil peeking, which concerns the 
effectiveness of a given regulatory scheme. Veil peeking should not be deemed 
to be necessarily exceptional nor to require a showing of willful abuse. 
Conversely, criteria such as the existence of “domination or control” is 
absolutely critical for veil peeking, but less so for veil piercing.168 
 
163 See Macey & Mitts, supra note 4, at 100. 
164 Id. at 102. 
165 For empirical studies on veil piercing that do not distinguish between exceptions to asset 
and regulatory partitioning, see generally, for example, id.; Thompson, supra note 4; Oh, supra note 4. 
166 See, e.g., supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
167 See, e.g., supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text and infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
168 Some have critiqued the use of the control or domination criterion in veil piercing claims. 
See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the 
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 854 (1997) (finding that the significance of 
domination is “often misunderstood,” while control tends to be a “red herring” for justifying veil 
piercing); Jonathan R. Macey, The Central Role of Myth in Corporate Law 37 (Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 519, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435676 (arguing that the use of 
corporate control or domination as a possible criterion for veil piercing leads to a general myth that 
“parent companies operate their subsidiaries in a manner that is wholly independent of the 
operations of both the parent corporation and the subsidiaries’ affiliates”). Insofar as traditional veil 
piercing doctrinal criteria such as “alter ego,” “unity of interest,” and “control and domination” 
effectively serve as proxies for corporate control, they should be part of the test for veil peeking. 
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Because judicial veil peeking fundamentally concerns gap filling of legal 
texts, courts should consider the purposes of the law in question, and the 
extent to which upholding regulatory partitioning may compromise the law’s 
desired effectiveness.169 At any rate, the costs and benefits of veil peeking 
must be assessed in view of the particular objectives of a given legal rule and 
area of law. As correctly argued nearly a century ago, “the question whether a 
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from the stockholders cannot be 
asked, or answered, in vacuo.”170 
VI. VEIL PEEKING IN CONTEMPORARY LAW 
Veil peeking remains prevalent and controversial in a broad range of 
fields. This Part explores a representative sample of veil peeking cases to 
demonstrate the breadth and importance of this phenomenon, as well as its 
different manifestations and challenges. 
A. Incorporating Race 
After veil peeking cases of the Jim Crow era were resolved through the 
strict application of regulatory partitioning (leading to “colorless 
corporations”), various statutory initiatives sought to impose differential 
treatment on companies depending on the race of their members. These 
initiatives range from the odious, such as the Nazi’s attempt to ascribe Jewish 
identity to legal persons,171 to the well-intentioned but controversial, such as 
the granting of favorable treatment for minority-controlled businesses with 
the aim of remediating the effects of past discrimination and injustice. 
Both federal and local laws in the United States have embraced statutory 
veil peeking to confer remedial advantages to business organizations owned 
and controlled by minorities. The Public Works and Employment Act of 1977 
required that, absent an administrative waiver, at least ten percent of federal 
funds granted to public works should be used by state or local grantees to 
procure services from business owned by certain minorities.172 Similarly, the 
city of Richmond adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan requiring city 
 
169 Considerations of “justice” traditionally mentioned in veil piercing cases may help provide 
the doctrinal rubric for this assessment. 
170 Latty, supra note 79, at 603; see also id. at 621 (“The defects of the intransigent conceptualism 
which apparently accompanies the entity technique are of themselves a source of danger in legal thinking.”). 
171 For instance, the Nuremberg laws qualified as Jewish a legal person if any of its legal 
representatives, members of the supervisory board, or controlling shareholders were Jews. Although 
Hitler initially sought to limit corporate anonymity by banning bearer shares, the proposal faced 
resistance from the corporate community and was ultimately abandoned. Brooks, supra note 80, at 2079-80. 
172 Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, sec. 103, § 106(f)(2), 91 Stat. 116, 
117 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)). 
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contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each 
contract to enterprises that were at least fifty-one percent owned and 
controlled by the same minority groups.173 
These are cases of explicit veil peeking by lawmakers, as opposed to 
judicial veil peeking as gap filling. The question, then, concerns the 
constitutional permissibility of such differential regulatory treatment based 
on race. Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the favorable 
treatment afforded to minority-owned businesses in the federal Public Works 
and Employment Act in Fullilove v. Klutznick174 but invalidated the Richmond 
program as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.175 However, the City 
of Richmond opinion arguably departed from precedent about colorless 
corporations by tacitly resorting to veil peeking, in that it “implicitly 
recognized that corporations can have racial characteristics by allowing white 
owned corporations to challenge contractor set asides on reverse 
discrimination grounds.”176 
There are also traditional cases of judicial veil peeking where the relevant 
statute is silent. One prominent such statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (originally 
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866), which protects the equal rights of 
“[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to make and 
enforce contracts” without respect to race.177 The issue here is whether 
corporations can claim a racial identity in § 1981 claims based on the racial 
identity of its members. Various courts have answered in the affirmative.178 
In Thinket Ink Information Resources, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit engaged in veil peeking to hold that a corporation entirely 
owned by African Americans and certified by the United States Small 
Business Act as a firm owned by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals could raise a discrimination claim under § 1981.179 While 
acknowledging the “anti-anthropomorphic truism” that a corporation 
generally has no racial identity, the court concluded that a corporation can 
acquire an “imputed racial identity” in certain cases so as not to leave it and 
its shareholders without remedies.180 The court reasoned that “if a 
 
173 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989). 
174 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980). 
175 488 U.S. at 511. 
176 Brooks, supra note 80, at 2056 n.150 (quoting Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun 
Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
177 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); see also Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
178 See, e.g., Carnell Constr. Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 745 F.3d 703, 
715 (4th Cir. 2014); Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Grp. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 
2002); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1979). 
179 368 F.3d at 1059. 
180 Id. at 1058-59. 
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corporation can suffer harm from discrimination, it has standing to litigate 
that harm.”181 This instance of veil peeking extends the reach of state 
regulations but in a way that is shareholder friendly and increases the 
attractiveness of the corporate form. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the possibility of veil 
peeking in this context, its decision in Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald 
foreclosed the use of reverse veil peeking by denying shareholders standing 
to raise § 1981 claims in connection with contracts signed by the corporation 
in its own name.182 In that case, plaintiff John McDonald, a Black man, was 
the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments (JWM), which 
entered into several contracts with Domino’s Pizza.183 JWM subsequently 
filed for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy estate settled with Domino’s Pizza 
without raising a discrimination claim through veil peeking.184 
The Ninth Circuit recognized the sole shareholder’s standing to sue for 
the wrongful breach of contract due to racial animus by conceding the 
existence of “injuries distinct from that of the corporation” (such as pain and 
suffering, emotional distress and humiliation).185 However, the unanimous 
decision of the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, 
reversed the Ninth Circuit and found no standing.186 In refusing to extend 
the reach of the statute, Scalia wrote that “it is fundamental corporation and 
agency law—indeed, it can be said to be the whole purpose of corporation 
and agency law—that the shareholder and contracting officer of a corporation 
has no rights and is exposed to no liability under the corporation’s 
contracts”187 and that “nothing in the text of § 1981 suggests that it was meant 
to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice.”188 The holding can be 
understood as seeking to uphold a restrictive interpretation of the statute and 
avoid the administrative challenges associated with reverse veil peeking. 
However, as examined above,189 a plaintiff victory in the case would not in 
fact have compromised the functionality of the corporation’s core elements. 
 
181 Id. at 1060 (quoting Gersman v. Grp. Health Ass’n, 931 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 
vacated on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1068 (1992)). 
182 546 U.S. 470, 476-77 (2006). 
183 Id. at 472. 
184 Id. at 473. 
185 Id. at 474 (quoting McDonald v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 107 F. App’x 18, 18 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
186 Id. at 480. 
187 Id. at 477. 
188 Id. at 479. 
189 See infra Section V.A. 
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B. Antitrust 
Veil peeking has a long pedigree in competition law, a field that has from 
the outset witnessed the use of legal entities for regulatory arbitrage. The use 
of the trust form—leading to the field’s name antitrust—was itself an attempt 
to evade the competition-driven constraints of early corporation laws.190 
Nevertheless, as State v. Standard Oil and similar cases made clear, courts were 
willing to engage in veil peeking to restrict such arbitrage opportunities.191 
Perhaps more than any other field, antitrust law has fiercely disregarded 
separate legal personalities in favor of veil peeking. While certain 
jurisdictions at times also resort to veil piercing in the antitrust context (such 
as by imposing liability on parent companies for antitrust violations by their 
subsidiaries)192, veil peeking for purposes of imputation of legal restrictions 
is even more prevalent. The relevant tests for the application of antitrust laws 
tend to be economic rather than formalistic in nature, thereby valuing 
corporate control and the identity of shareholders and disregarding separate 
legal personalities. 
As is usually the case with veil peeking, such an approach is not 
unambiguously pro- or anti-regulation, but instead can cut either way. 
Although early instances of veil peeking served to strengthen state authority 
over market activities, more recent cases operate to restrict the scope of 
antitrust laws.193 However, unlike other fields, the circumvention of 
regulatory partitioning in antitrust law has only rarely been conceptualized 
as “veil piercing,” and antitrust has benefited greatly by avoiding the doctrinal 
confusion associated with the misleading label.194 
In the leading case of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that a wholly owned subsidiary is incapable of 
conspiring with its parent under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,195 which 
requires a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” between separate 
persons.196 The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the 
provision in question does not reach conduct that is “wholly unilateral,” a 
 
190 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 63-64 (explaining the origin of the term). 
191 See supra Section II.C. 
192 See generally Karl Hofstetter & Melanie Ludescher, Fines Against Parent Companies in EU 
Antitrust Law: Setting Incentives for ‘Best Practice Compliance,’ 33 WORLD COMPETITION 55 (2010) 
(discussing the EU’s imposition of fines on parent companies for their subsidiaries’ violations of 
competition law). 
193 See, e.g., infra Section VI.B. 
194 One exception is the seminal paper by Maurice Wormser. See Wormser, supra note 12, at 
509-10 (citing the early antitrust precedents of Standard Oil and North River Sugar Refining Co. 
discussed in supra Section II.C). 
195 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). 
196 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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conclusion that relies on the irrelevance of separate legal personalities for 
antitrust purposes.197 
For the Court, the relevant factor for the purposes of Section 1 was not 
the formal presence of multiple persons (commonly referred to as the 
“plurality” requirement in antitrust law), but the functional characterization 
of “separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,” the 
conspiracy between whom “deprives the marketplace of the independent 
centers of decisionmaking.”198 This element is notably absent in the 
relationship between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary.199 In adopting 
a veil peeking approach that excludes the possibility of “intra-enterprise 
conspiracy” between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary, the Court’s 
opinion explicitly supports a principle of organizational neutrality by seeking 
to level the playing field between enterprises adopting different legal entity 
structures.200 It reasons that antitrust laws should not prevent firms from 
enjoying other benefits of separate incorporation, such as facilitating 
management, avoiding tax problems, or “serv[ing] other legitimate 
interests.”201 In Justice Burger’s words, “[i]f antitrust liability turned on the 
garb in which a corporate subunit was clothed, parent corporations would be 
encouraged to convert subsidiaries into unincorporated divisions.”202 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion, by contrast, argued that the veil 
peeking approach embraced by the majority detracted from the underlying 
statutory objectives.203 It reasoned that the requirement of a plurality of 
actors under Section 1 results from “the plain statutory language, not [from] 
any economic principle.”204 Justice Stevens further contended that the 
unreasonable restraint requirement of Section 1 already protects parent-
subsidiary structures because such affiliation often enhances efficiency and is 
thus procompetitive.205 Consequently, the categorical peeking of the majority 
“leaves a significant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to 
anticompetitive conduct that is entirely unrelated to the efficiencies 
associated with integration.”206 
Following Copperweld, the question became the scope of the Court’s 
categorical veil peeking approach beyond the context of wholly owned 
 
197 Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 768 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), 
overruled on other grounds by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)). 
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200 Id. at 772. 
201 Id. at 772-73. 
202 Id. at 773. 
203 Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
204 Id. at 789. 
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subsidiaries, hence illustrating how categorical approaches to veil peeking 
may compel subsequent tailoring. Are subsidiaries with de minimis departure 
from whole ownership by the parent exempted from Section 1 scrutiny under 
Copperweld? Is the exercise of corporate control over the subsidiary the 
relevant test? If so, how should courts draw the line? 
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the agreement between members of the National Football 
League, a joint venture of the football teams, was categorically excluded from 
scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.207 The Court, once again, 
affirmed the prevalence of “competitive reality,” privileging economic 
function over legal entity boundaries.208 
The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stevens held that just as the 
presence of “legally distinct entities” is not determinative, “nor . . . is it 
determinative that two legally distinct entities have organized themselves 
under a single umbrella or into a structured joint venture.”209 Consequently, 
the joint venture was not categorically excluded from Section 1 and was 
therefore allowed to be scrutinized further under antitrust law’s Rule of 
Reason.210 In view of such radical veil peeking, it has been said that the 
“corporate form under state law does not matter” in the U.S. Supreme Court 
antitrust jurisprudence.211 
C. Nationality 
Differences in the legal treatment conferred on nationals vis-à-vis 
foreigners are a central source of legal discrimination in modern law. The 
attribution of nationality to corporations usually entails a bundle of legal 
consequences. These include the determination of the internal rules of 
corporate law applicable to the company; legal privileges bestowed on 
nationals such as access to government subsidies; restrictions imposed on 
certain foreign nationals such as wartime rules on trading with the enemy and 
national security rules, or foreign nationals generally such as foreign 
ownership restrictions in certain industries; access to diplomatic protection; 
coverage under international treaties; the application of tax laws; and the 
existence of state jurisdiction for legal disputes involving the company. 
Jurisdictions around the world generally opt for one of two criteria for the 
attribution of nationality: (1) the place of incorporation, or (2) the principal 
 
207 560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010). 
208 Id. at 196. 
209 Id. 
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place of business (“real seat doctrine”).212 Jurisdictions embracing the real seat 
doctrine typically require local incorporation of companies headquartered in 
the state.213 Both criteria are objective and do not consider the company’s 
shareholder base or control structure, which is often fluid in business 
corporations given the attribute of transferable shares. In other words, the 
two general approaches to corporate nationality both shun veil peeking. 
Because the place of incorporation can be altered at less cost than 
corporate headquarters, it is more often the object of choice, enabling the 
phenomenon known as regulatory competition. While the corporate law 
component of the bundle has been traditionally viewed as the primary driver 
of regulatory competition, companies have increasingly considered other 
legal consequences when engaging in nationality shopping, such as tax laws214 
and legal protection under international investment treaties.215 Of course, the 
utilization of a single doctrinal hook for such varied purposes may not be 
functional in all circumstances. 
In a well-known incident in 2018, a U.S. presidential decree prevented 
technology firm Broadcom from acquiring its rival Qualcomm based on the 
risk the transaction posed to U.S. national security.216 Broadcom was deemed 
to be a foreign buyer and subject to regulatory scrutiny based on its 
incorporation in Singapore.217 It was deemed to be foreign even though it had 
been previously chartered in the United States, was in the process of 
reincorporating in the United States, was headquartered in California, most 
of its directors were U.S. citizens, and more than fifty percent of its workers 
and of ninety percent of its shareholders were based in the United States.218 
Had Broadcom never moved its statutory domicile to Singapore for tax 
purposes, or had reincorporated in the United States with greater speed, it 
 
212 For the origins of these criteria and their exceptions, see generally Mariana Pargendler, The 
Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law, 95 IND. L.J. 533, 541, 564 (2020). 
213 Id. at 538. 
214 This is exemplified by the recent wave of corporate inversions. See Colleen Walsh, Getting 
a Handle on Inversion: A Q&A with Mihir Desai, HARV. L. TODAY (Aug. 15, 2014), 
https://today.law.harvard.edu/harvard-gazette-mihir-desai-getting-handle-inversion 
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headquarters for tax purposes to the American worldwide tax regime and high corporate tax rate). 
215 See infra notes 223–28 and accompanying text. 
216 Presidential Order Regarding the Proposed Takeover of Qualcomm Incorporated by 
Broadcom Limited, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,631 (Mar. 15, 2018). 
217 See Jason Benitez, CFIUS: The Next Poison Pill? 3 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
218 See id. at 3, 44-45. However, Broadcom’s CEO Tan Hock Eng is Malaysian. Amir Hisyam 
Rasid, Malaysian Is US’ Best-Paid CEO, NEW STRAITSTIMES (May 15, 2008, 6:50 AM), 
https://www.nst.com.my/business/2018/05/369778/malaysian-us-best-paid-ceo 
[https://perma.cc/L8KB-JYY2]. To the extent that this fact played a part in the incident, it would 
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would have likely escaped regulatory scrutiny.219 Nevertheless, in view of the 
threat posed by the technological rise of China, the Committee for Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and President Trump refused to 
peek and treat Broadcom as a domestic company. 
Veil peeking regarding nationality is not limited to the sensitive 
considerations of wartime or peacetime national security described above. In 
a prominent 1953 decision, a U.K. court engaged in veil peeking to deny the 
benefits of quotas under the Cinematograph Films Act of 1938 to a film 
produced by a U.K.-incorporated subsidiary that was ninety percent owned 
and controlled by a U.S. company and had no significant assets or employees 
of its own.220 The court found that the U.K. company was a mere agent or 
nominee of the U.S. parent, so that the film could not be deemed “British” 
under the statutory language requiring the maker of the film to be a “British 
subject or a British company.”221 
The field of international investment law is premised on the need to 
provide enhanced legal protection to foreign investors at the international 
level, with the aim of counteracting the protectionist tendencies of host states 
to expropriate foreigners once their investment is “sunk.”222 Regulatory 
differentiation between nationals and foreigners is therefore central to the 
field. Predictably, the disparate legal regime gives rise to various forms of veil 
peeking controversies, due both to the design of international treaties and to 
attempts at regulatory arbitrage. 
The rising phenomenon of “nationality shopping” in international 
investment law illustrates the arbitrage opportunity. This strategy takes place 
when investors who would not be protected under international investment 
law—either because they are nationals of the host state or because they are 
citizens of a country that is not a signatory—employ a corporation formed in 
a jurisdiction with broad treaty coverage to benefit from enhanced investment 
protection. One manifestation of this trend is the so-called “Dutch sandwich” 
strategy, which refers to the formation of foreign (often Dutch) intermediary 
subsidiaries in states with ample bilateral investment treaty (BIT) coverage 
to obtain enhanced investment protection at home or abroad.223 
 
219 For an in-depth discussion of this transaction, see generally Benitez, supra note 217, which 
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Arbitral tribunals have generally upheld such arbitrage attempts based on 
the absence of the traditional requirements for veil piercing, such as fraud or 
commingling of assets. In Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, for instance, the arbitral 
panel ruled that a company that was ninety-nine percent owned by Ukrainians 
but incorporated in Lithuania could pursue investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) arbitration against the shareholders’ home state of Ukraine under the 
Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.224 Such a case upholding strict regulatory 
partitioning encourages organizational arbitrage. 
The dissenting opinion in the Tokios Tokelés case emphasizes that the 
controversy in question was not ultimately about international investment.225 
Similarly, commentators have decried the arbitrators’ reliance on “an 
inapposite presumption against veil piercing derived from the very different 
context of limited shareholder liability, without considering the different 
interests and values at stake across these varied situations.”226 While 
exceptions exist,227 investment tribunals have generally indicated a “deep 
unwillingness to look through” the corporate veil to restrict the application 
of BITs.228 
However, the use of the state of incorporation as the determinant of 
international law protection is not always a boon for investors. In the case of 
Barcelona Traction, the Belgian government filed suit in the International 
Court of Justice seeking reparations from Spain.229 Belgium alleged that 
Spain violated international law in causing damage to the Belgian 
shareholders who controlled Barcelona Traction, a company incorporated in 
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Canada.230 Belgium also claimed that Spanish authorities had improperly 
discriminated against the company, thereby harming its Belgian shareholders, 
with the purpose of transferring control over its property to the hands of a 
private Spanish group.231 The International Court of Justice, however, refused 
to peek as advocated by Belgium, instead holding that it could not seek to 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Belgian shareholders of a company 
incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction when it was the company that suffered 
the direct harm.232 
Moreover, for a variety of tax, regulatory, and convenience reasons, it is 
common for foreign investors to operate in host countries through local 
subsidiaries, which would in principle qualify as national companies of the 
host state based on the place of incorporation. Recognizing this reality, some 
U.S. BITs expressly provide for veil peeking by permitting a local company 
to invoke treaty protection as a constructive foreign investor if the company 
itself would qualify as a covered investment under the treaty.233 
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) Convention also adopts a veil peeking approach in providing that a 
legal person that is a national of the host state, but subject to “foreign control,” 
should be treated as a national of another contracting state.234 Moreover, 
international investment law provides for the noteworthy possibility of 
foreign shareholder claims for reflective losses, which represents one of the 
rare instances of reverse veil peeking. This regime allows foreign shareholders 
to file claims against host states, in the shareholders’ own names, to recover 
the reflective loss they suffered due to the expropriation of a domestic 
corporation. The availability of claims for shareholder reflective loss has 
attracted much scholarly criticism.235 While this form of reverse veil peeking 
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does create problems of administration, it does not upend the core tenets of 
the corporate form.236 
While apparently contradictory, the strict regulatory partitioning 
approach of Tokios Tokelés and the bold approaches of veil peeking (in 
attributing the shareholders’ nationality to the domestic company) and 
reverse veil peeking (in permitting direct shareholder lawsuits) of investment 
treaties are actually consistent in their pro-investor results. Veil peeking and 
reverse veil peeking are broadly employed to expand treaty coverage, while 
arbitral tribunals eschew veil peeking to restrict the scope of protection 
provided by international investment treaties. This landscape may reflect the 
purposive interpretation of the international investment regime, which aims 
precisely to protect investors, or the self-interest of arbitrators, who stand to 
gain by expanding the number and scope of international investment claims. 
D. Jurisdiction 
The attribution of jurisdiction is another critical legal consequence of 
incorporation, or the creation of a separate legal person. Most states recognize 
both the place of incorporation and the principal place of business as grounds 
for the assertion of general jurisdiction with respect to legal persons. The 
broad veil peeking criterion of individual corporate membership used in Bank 
of the United States v. Deveaux has been abandoned since the mid-nineteenth 
century due to its ease of manipulation and dysfunctional results.237 
However, veil peeking continues to be used for jurisdictional purposes in 
the corporate group context. One question is whether a plaintiff may impute 
to a corporate parent the jurisdictional grounds that exist with respect to one 
of its subsidiaries, or vice-versa. The 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman238 deals precisely with such a use of veil peeking. In 
that case, Argentinean plaintiffs filed suit in California against Daimler, a 
Germany public company, under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute.239 The suit 
alleged that Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated 
with the Argentinean government to kill and torture workers in the 1976–
1983 “Dirty War.”240 Plaintiffs sought to assert personal jurisdiction over 
Daimler in California based on the distribution of vehicles by Mercedes-Benz 
USA LLC, a Delaware corporation, in California.241 
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The Daimler opinion received much attention for the Court’s narrowing 
of all-purpose jurisdiction to the paradigmatic grounds of place of 
incorporation and principal place of business, finding the existence of 
“continuous and systematic” business in the state to be insufficient.242 
However, the veil peeking move of Daimler’s plaintiffs in relying on a parent’s 
jurisdictional ground for a lawsuit against the subsidiary (provided that it 
meets the stricter criteria) was not addressed by the decision and continues 
to be used.243 In this case of veil peeking—to impute jurisdiction to the parent 
without imposing liability on it—courts have focused on control based on 
agency and alter ego theories, without, however, requiring a showing of fraud 
or injustice as in typical veil piercing claims.244 
France’s COMILOG case, which has been celebrated in human rights 
circles, provides another instance of veil peeking for jurisdictional purposes. 
In 1991, the Gabonese Ougooué Mining Company (COMILOG) dismissed 
995 workers without notice or compensation and filed for bankruptcy 
following a deadly train accident.245 In 2003, COMILOG and the 
governments of Congo and Gabon reached an agreement by which the 
company would pay the states over one million euros as settlement for the 
workers’ claims.246 However, the workers were not consulted regarding the 
agreement and did not receive any compensation.247 
Following the acquisition of a majority of COMILOG’s stock by French 
company ERAMET (which was headquartered in France and twenty-six 
percent owned by the French government248) in the late 1990s, the Congolese 
workers filed suit in France.249 The Paris Court of Appeals found that 
COMILOG’s status as a subsidiary of ERAMET provided sufficient 
connection to France to exercise jurisdiction and held COMILOG liable to 
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the Congolese workers.250 While admirable for permitting the compensation 
of past victims of human rights violations, the COMILOG case illustrates how 
veil peeking may discourage share transferability, as discussed in Part V above. 
E. Tax Laws 
Taxation is another fertile field for veil peeking. One line of cases 
concerns the constitutionality of disparate tax treatment conferred on 
different legal entities. The famous case of Santa Clara County v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad,251 which is widely credited for recognizing that corporations 
are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, dealt with California tax rules 
that treated corporations less favorably than individuals. Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court ultimately decided the case on narrow grounds despite the 
misleading syllabus and headnotes,252 Circuit Justice Field’s opinion 
described the discriminatory treatment of corporations as “the very essence 
of tyranny.”253 
To be sure, not all instances of disparate regulatory treatment of 
corporations are unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the 
constitutionality of the corporate income tax as “an excise upon the particular 
privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity.”254 Other jurisdictions, 
such as Brazil and, increasingly, the United States, tax legal persons more 
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favorably than natural persons, thereby encouraging incorporation of service 
providers as a form of tax shelter.255 
The place of incorporation is often a relevant hook for the application of 
tax laws, even if it is at times complemented by other criteria such as 
headquarters location and shareholder control. Such reliance on incorporation 
as the relevant hook for taxation creates opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, 
which, in turn, tempts tax authorities to engage in veil peeking. 
U.S. courts curb the evasion of tax laws based on fictitious transactions 
that serve no economic purpose beyond tax savings.256 Courts have applied 
veil peeking to question the economic benefits of the creation of a subsidiary 
as a tax shelter when the company initiating the transaction retains full 
control.257 As an economic expert in these cases, Nobel laureate Oliver Hart 
has argued that the boundaries of the firm are determined by control rights, 
not by legal entity distinctions.258 According to this view, reorganizations that 
create a new legal person but do not meaningfully change the allocation of 
control rights have no economic substance under the “property rights theory 
of the firm,” which disqualifies it for favorable tax treatment.259 
Similarly, Brazilian laws apply a simplified tax regime with lower tax rates 
to small enterprises whose revenue falls below certain thresholds.260 
Entrepreneurs may want to take advantage of the favorable treatment to 
smaller firms by constituting several legal persons for different parts of the 
business. The Brazilian tax statute, however, engages in veil peeking to ignore 
the legal entity boundaries and consider the combined revenue of the 
 
255 See, e.g., Sérgio Wulff Gobetti & Rodrigo Octávio Orair, Taxation and Distribution of Income 
in Brazil: New Evidence from Personal Income Tax Data, 37 BRAZILIAN J. POL. ECON. 267, 272 (2017) 
(discussing incentives for the creation of tax shelters under Brazil’s tax laws); David Kamin, David 
Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. 
Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro & Manoj 
Viswanathan, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax 
Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (2019) (discussing incentives for the creation of tax shelters 
under post-2017 U.S. tax laws). 
256 For a description of the different doctrines to counteract abuse, see T. Christopher Borek, 
Angelo Frattarelli & Oliver Hart, Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm 
Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine, 57 J.L. & ECON. 975, 975-76 (2014). 
257 Id. at 986-95 (discussing Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87 (D. Md. 2003) 
and WFC Holdings Corp. v. United States, No. 07-3320, 2011 WL 4583817 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2011), as 
cases in which subsidiaries were treated as mere divisions (from an economic perspective) given the 
maintenance of complete control). 
258 Id. at 975, 996 (“[F]rom an economic substance perspective, control is the defining 
characteristic of ownership . . . .”) 
259 See id. at 977, 996; see also Oliver Hart, Dep’t of Econ., Harv. Univ., Nobel Prize Lecture: 
Incomplete Contracts and Control (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/hart-
lecture.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EGT-WNUH] (referring to the uses of the property theory of the firm 
to inquire into control in the context of tax disputes). 
260 Lei Complementar No. 123, de 14 de Dezembro de 2006, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 
15.12.2006 (Braz.). 
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different companies whenever they are subject to common control.261 
Brazilian tax laws also offer favorable treatment to foreign investors and, as 
such, have encouraged Brazilian citizens to incorporate abroad, thus also 
triggering veil peeking efforts by the tax authorities.262 
Veil peeking is also relevant for the application of international tax 
treaties. The issue is whether an intermediate holding company may qualify 
for an international tax treaty or if tax laws should instead look for beneficial 
ownership. In view of a “Dutch sandwich” providing for an intermediary 
Dutch company, Canadian courts have applied the Canada-Netherlands 
Income Tax Treaty, even though the Dutch vehicle was controlled by Swedish 
and U.K. companies.263 Commentators have criticized this approach by 
implicitly calling for a distinction between veil piercing and veil peeking, 
arguing that the Canadian courts erred in applying the demanding tests for 
veil piercing in cases where the verification of beneficial ownership should 
have sufficed.264 
Finally, tax statutes at times explicitly adopt a veil peeking approach by 
conditioning the legal regime on the identity of shareholders. One prominent 
example is the use of check-the-box regulation in the United States, which 
permits corporations to choose to be treated as pass-through vehicles for tax 
purposes, provided they have no more than 100 shareholders who are all 
individuals and do not qualify as nonresident aliens.265 Another instance is 
the common practice of offering corporate income tax exemptions or 
deductions to intercorporate dividends paid by companies within the same 
corporate group.266 Finally, certain tax statutes embrace veil peeking by 
apportioning tax obligations in view of the underlying “unitary business,” 
irrespective of legal entity boundaries.267 
 
261 Id. art. 3º, § 4º, IV. 
262 Fabio Graner & Fábio Puppo, Receita Aponta Indícios de Fraude em Investimento de Não 
Residentes, VALOR (Oct. 30, 2017), https://valor.globo.com/financas/noticia/2017/10/30/receita-
aponta-indicios-de-fraude-em-investimento-de-nao-residentes-1.ghtml [https://perma.cc/Q2CF-6BHY]. 
263 See Saurabh Jain & John Prebble, Conceptual Problems of Beneficial Ownership and the 
Corporate Veil, 73 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 3 (2019) (describing the decisions of Canadian courts in Prévost 
Car Inc. v. The Queen, [2008] D.T.C. 3080 (Can. Tax Ct.) and Velcro Can. Inc. v. The Queen, [2012] 4 
C.T.C. 2029 (Can. Tax Ct.)). 
264 Id. § 13 (“It is illogical to draw an analogy between the beneficial ownership test and the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.”). 
265 See I.R.C. § 1361 (defining an S corporation); id. § 1366 (allowing for pass-thru taxation). 
For an additional example of veil peeking in U.S. tax legislation, see I.R.C. §§ 951-965, which taxes 
foreign corporations controlled by U.S. shareholders on certain corporate income earned and not distributed. 
266 For a description of the evolution of the taxation of intercorporate dividends in the U.S. 
tax legislation, see Eugene Kandel, Konstantin Kosenko, Randall Morck & Yishay Yafeh, The Great 
Pyramids of America: A Revised History of U.S. Business Groups, Corporate Ownership, and Regulation, 
1926–1950, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 781 (2018). 
267 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980) (“The argument 
that the source of the income precludes its taxability runs contrary to precedent.”). 
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F. International Sanctions 
Another veil peeking scenario in the international context pertains to 
whether and how international sanctions imposed on individuals should be 
extended to the corporations they control. Take, for instance, the recent 
sanctions imposed by the U.S. government on Russian parties as punishment 
for Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. election and aggressions in 
Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria.268 The sanctions not only covered 
Russian government officials, state-owned enterprises, and oligarchs close to 
President Vladimir Putin, but also adopted a veil peeking approach to reach 
the companies controlled by these oligarchs.269 
The sanctions covered twelve companies controlled by Oleg Deripaska 
(including the EN+ Group and aluminum company RUSAL, which accounts 
for seven percent of global aluminum production), and extended to any 
foreign businesses who attempted to do businesses with the designated 
entities.270 The extension of the sanctions to the companies was highly 
consequential. Rio Tinto declared force majeure on a major contract to supply 
bauxite to RUSAL, aluminum prices rose, and Russian stock prices dropped 
following the announcement of the sanctions.271 In view of RUSAL’s market 
share for aluminum, the effects of the sanctions on global supply chains were 
likely to be significant.272 
To escape the sanctions, the affected companies implemented various 
corporate governance reforms aimed at insulating the entities from 
Deripaska’s control. The new governance arrangements included a reduction 
in Deripaska’s stake in the firm to below fifty percent, restrictions on voting 
rights to thirty-five percent, the assignment of voting rights of related parties 
 
268 The very imposition of sanctions against Deripaska, deemed to be a close ally of Putin is 
premised on his “having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a senior 
official of the Government of the Russian Federation” and the fact that “he does not separate himself 
from the Russian state.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Russian 




271 Rio To Call Force Majeure on Some Rusal-Linked Contracts, REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions-rio-tinto/rio-to-call-force-majeure-on-
some-rusal-linked-contracts-idUSKBN1HK274 [https://perma.cc/QT29-R5VY] (Apr. 13, 2013, 11:17 
AM); Fred Imbert, Russian Stocks Crash on New Sanctions; Aluminum Prices Soar on Penalties to Global 
Producer Rusal, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/russian-stocks-crash-on-new-
sanctions-aluminum-prices-soar-on-penalties-to-global-producer-rusal.html 
[https://perma.cc/PW8M-9JVV]. 
272 For an excellent discussion of the imposition of sanctions on companies controlled by 
Deripaska and the use of corporate governance to avoid them, see Daniel K. Phillips, The 
Development of Corporate Governance in Post-Soviet Russia and Its Instrumentalization by a Post-
Soviet Russian (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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to an independent third party, and an independent board of directors, among 
other measures.273 The U.S. Department of the Treasury eventually agreed to 
lift the sanctions in response to these changes.274 
Nevertheless, critics of the sanctions’ lifting have argued that insulation 
from Deripaska was illusory, given that the shares were transferred to a trust 
for the benefit of his children.275 The controversy illustrates well the difficulty 
of ascertaining control for purposes of veil peeking. Deripaska, on his part, 
has sued the U.S. government, arguing that the sanctions had made him 
“radioactive” in international business circles, an effect largely attributable to 
the veil peeking approach.276 
Even when controlled companies are not specifically designated for 
sanctions, as was the case in the Russia-Deripaska sanctions above, they can 
still be subject to rule-based veil peeking in accordance with the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
rules. Under the OFAC 50 Percent Rule, all companies that are fifty percent 
owned by sanctioned persons are automatically subject to the same 
sanctions.277 Adopting a bright-line rule approach, the 50 Percent Rule applies 
to ownership, which is more easily verifiable than control, so controlled 
companies that are less than fifty percent owned need to be specifically 
designated for sanctions.278 
G. Government Corporations 
The question of regulatory differentiation across legal entities has two 
dimensions when applied to corporations. First, there is the question of 
whether the state may treat corporations less favorably than natural persons 
or whether the rights of natural persons can instead be attributed to the legal 
persons they own and control. Second, there is the question of whether 
corporations, as major organizations rivaling or surpassing governments in 
 
273 Id. at 28. 
274 See Kevin Bohn, Treasury Department Lifts Sanctions on Three Russian Firms with Ties to Oleg 
Deripaska, CNN POL. (Jan. 27, 2019, 8:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/27/politics/trump-
admin-lifts-sanctions-oleg-deripaska/index.html [https://perma.cc/UV9U-A2ME] (showing how 
corporate governance mechanisms can serve as an antidote to veil peeking). 
275 See Kenneth P. Vogel & Alan Rappeport, Russian Oligarch Sues the U.S. Over Sanctions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/us/politics/oleg-deripaska-russia-
sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/2PKD-RP34]. 
276 Complaint at 17, Deripaska v. Mnuchin, No. 1:19-CV-00727 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2019). 
277 Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in 
Property Are Blocked, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,726, 47,726 (Aug. 14, 2014). 
278 Frequently Asked Questions: Entities Owned by Blocked Person (50% Rule), U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY (Aug. 11, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1521 
[https://perma.cc/7ZDL-9AR7]. 
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economic importance,279 should be subject to legal duties comparable to those 
governing the state. This latter question is increasingly the object of debate, 
especially in the international law sphere,280 but it is not a question of veil 
peeking, as it does not entail the attribution of shareholder legal 
characteristics to the corporation. 
Veil peeking questions are, however, critical in the context of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE). Should state-owned enterprises be treated as state actors, 
given the state’s equity ownership and control? Or should they be subject to 
the general private legal regime applicable to business corporations, given 
their legal form? To put it differently, can the state avoid some of its public law 
constraints by employing the corporate form to perform certain activities? 
Legal arbitrage aimed at avoiding the more cumbersome legal regime 
applicable to the state is, in fact, a key practical justification for the use of 
government-controlled corporations. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
boasted the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 as “a 
corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the 
flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise.”281 By adopting the corporate 
form, the state becomes not only subject to corporate law but also to other 
components of the legal regime governing private organizations. 
However, the use of the corporate form is not a complete shield against 
the public law regime, as courts often peek through the corporate veil to apply 
the state’s legal regime to SOEs.282 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.283 provides a useful example. 
Amtrak, a railroad corporation owned and controlled by the U.S. government, 
had prohibited the display of political advertising messages at New York’s 
Penn Station.284 
 
279 See 69 of the Richest 100 Entities on the Planet are Corporations, not Governments, Figures Show, 
GLOB. JUST. NOW (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/2018/oct/17/69-richest-
100-entities-planet-are-corporations-not-governments-figures-show [https://perma.cc/7BEG-GD6J] 
(demonstrating the relative economic power of corporations relative to governments). 
280 See, e.g., Off. of the High Comm’r, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/11/04, at 1, (2011) (differentiating between the state’s duty to protect human rights and 
businesses’ duty to respect human rights). 
281 The 1930s, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., https://www.tva.com/about-tva/our-history/the-1930s 
[https://perma.cc/U5WS-2F7R] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
282 For an early discussion of several veil peeking controversies regarding government-owned 
corporations in the United States, see Robert H. Schnell, Federally Owned Corporations and Their 
Legal Problems, 14 N.C. L. REV. 337, 366 (1936), which concluded that “the corporations have been 
reduced to the status of an ordinary suitor before the courts, and the principles of law as applied to 
private litigants have controlled when there would be no disadvantage to the federal government by 
so doing.” See also, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (ruling that a 
corporate entity owned and controlled by the U.S. government was subject to the First Amendment). 
283 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
284 Id. at 377. 
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In Lebron, the question was whether Amtrak, whose company’s charter 
explicitly disclaimed its status as a government entity, violated the First 
Amendment.285 Answering in the affirmative, the majority opinion engaged 
in veil peeking to attribute the government’s legal regime to Amtrak in view 
of its governmental objectives and the government’s ability to appoint a 
majority of its directors.286 Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, by 
contrast, qualified the question on which the Court granted certiorari as 
essentially a distinct one of reverse veil peeking, that is, “[w]hether the 
alleged suppression of Lebron’s speech by Amtrak, as a concededly private 
entity, should be imputed to the Government.”287 
More frequently, however, national constitutions and statutes expressly 
incorporate a veil peeking approach by subjecting government-controlled 
corporations to at least some of the public law constraints applied to the state. 
Examples of such constraints are the application of public law mechanisms of 
supervision such as controls by accounts tribunals and parliament and a 
special labor and contracting regime.288 The result is that most SOEs, 
including those whose shares are traded in public markets, are subject to a 
distinctively hybrid regime; they are governed by roughly the same corporate 
laws applicable to private firms and by a host of public law exceptions in 
various areas. 
In other realms, such as the application of sovereign immunity, the legal 
regime is even less deferential to legal entity boundaries, privileging instead 
the nature and purpose of the activity in question. Although the law is murky, 
most legal instruments in this area embrace veil peeking to recognize that 
separately incorporated SOEs nevertheless enjoy sovereign immunity if they 
exercise governmental functions.289 Conversely, the same laws also establish 
another form of asset partitioning in the absence of a separate legal person, 
 
285 Id. at 392. 
286 Id. at 386, 391. 
287 Id. at 400 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
288 For a description of various components of such a hybrid regime, see generally Mariana 
Pargendler, Aldo Musachhio & Sergio G. Lazzarini, In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private 
Investment in State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569 (2013) (demonstrating constraints 
of the application of public law mechanisms of supervision such as controls by accounts tribunals 
and parliament); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed State-
Owned Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform, 50 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 473 (2017) (discussing the various components of a hybrid special labor and contracting regime). 
289 See Clifford Chance, STATE IMMUNITY AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2008) 
(relying on the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 
Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 
1978, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/33 [https://perma.cc/B6U7-XH7R], and the 2004 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res 
A/59/508 (Dec. 2, 2004), to assert that the acts that an entity performs are determinative of an 
entity’s treatment in court proceedings). 
776 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 717 
by providing that assets used by the state for commercial activities are subject 
to creditor enforcement, while those used for government purposes are not.290 
Interestingly, this is an area in which regulatory status and asset partitioning 
are primarily based on the character and purpose of the activity performed 
by the state rather than on legal entity formalities.291 
H. Corporate Law 
Veil peeking is also common in corporate law. In assessing conflicts of 
interest of controlling shareholders, courts habitually look behind the 
corporate structure to find the ultimate controller, thus ignoring the legal 
personality of intermediate holding companies for imputation purposes.292 
As in other fields, courts have also engaged in veil peeking to determine the 
scope of application of specific corporate law statutes. 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger 
International, Inc.293 exemplifies this approach. Here, the court had to decide 
whether the requirement that shareholders approve a sale of substantially all 
of a company’s assets under § 271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL) applied when the asset sale in question was conducted by a 
corporation’s wholly owned subsidiary.294 The defendant Hollinger 
International advanced a “technical statutory defense” based on the 
subsidiary’s separate legal personality, finding that “§ 271 would have no 
application unless the selling subsidiary has no corporate dignity under the 
strict test for veil piercing.”295 
The opinion by then-Vice Chancellor Leo Strine articulates the policy 
implications of both the reverse veil peeking approach advanced by the 
plaintiffs and the regulatory partitioning approach proposed by the 
defendants. The position upholding regulatory partitioning “has the virtues 
that accompany all bright-line tests, which are considerable, in that they 
provide clear guidance to transactional planners and limit litigation.”296 In 
 
290 Id. at 16. 
291 See id. at 2 (“[T]he form and structure of an entity and the nature of its legal and economic 
relationship to the State, is now less important than the character of the acts which the entity 
performs, and which form the subject matter of proceedings.”). 
292 See, e.g., In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962-VCL, 2016 
WL 301245, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016), reconsideration granted in part, 2016 WL 727771 (“An 
ultimate human controller who engages directly or indirectly in an interested transaction with a 
corporation is potentially liable for breach of duty, even if other corporate actors made the formal 
decision on behalf of the corporation, and even if the controller participated in the transaction 
through intervening entities.”). 
293 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, V.C.). 
294 Id. at 346. 
295 Id. at 348. 
296 Id. at 374. 
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addition, “[t]hat approach also adheres to the director-centered nature of our 
law, which leaves directors with wide managerial freedom subject to the 
strictures of equity, including entire fairness review of interested 
transactions,”297 and “[i]t is through this centralized management that 
stockholder wealth is largely created, or so much thinking goes.”298 On the 
other hand, regulatory partitioning engenders the familiar risk of evasion, in 
that “§ 271’s vote requirement will be rendered largely hortatory—reduced to 
an easily side-stepped gesture.”299 
The decision also stresses that the role of legal persons as a distinct nexus 
of imputation does not operate in an “all-or-nothing” manner, instead holding 
in certain contexts but not in others: 
These [reasons for the creation of subsidiaries] include the desire to limit 
liabilities to third parties involved in operating certain business lines to those 
lines and to minimize tax liability. That the law recognizes the separate 
existence of wholly owned subsidiaries for purposes like this does not 
necessarily mean that it should recognize their separate existence for all 
purposes. Yet, that is exactly what International’s argument is: that a wholly 
owned subsidiary is either without any legal dignity at all in the sense that it 
fails the severe test required to pierce the corporate veil or else its separate 
existence must be recognized in all contexts. The utility of this stark, binary 
approach is not immediately clear and does not comport with the approach 
Delaware has taken in other areas of its corporate law.300 
The Court, however, did not ultimately rule on the question of whether 
the application of § 271 authorizes a veil peeking approach to encompass a sale 
of assets by the subsidiary.301 Instead, Vice Chancellor Strine engaged in a 
form of preliminary peeking of sorts by tentatively imputing the subsidiary’s 
assets to the parent and then finding that, as a matter of “economic substance,” 
the transaction in question did not qualify as a sale of substantially all of its 
assets.302 Following the decision, the Delaware legislature amended the DGCL 
to fill in the existing gap. It did so by embracing reverse veil peeking at the 
statutory level to (1) provide that the assets of a wholly owned and controlled 
subsidiary would be considered assets of the parent corporation for purposes 
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sales, leases, and exchanges to and from a subsidiary from the requirement of 
a shareholder vote.303 
I. Contract Law 
Veil peeking is also common in contract disputes. Unlike contractual veil 
piercing claims, which center on the assets available to satisfy contractual 
obligations, contractual veil peeking focuses on the meaning and scope of 
contractual duties. Most contractual veil peeking cases concern regulatory 
arbitrage, as when one contract party establishes a separate legal person to 
evade existing contractual duties. The textbook example is the creation of a 
corporation by party A to carry out a type of business that party A is 
prohibited from pursuing due to a contractual covenant not to compete. 
Faced with this scenario, courts have often agreed to peek and find a 
contractual violation.304 Similarly, in the prominent UK case of Jones v. 
Lipman, Lipman had sold a property to plaintiffs, but subsequently, thinking 
better of the deal, sold the property to a newly created company wholly owned 
by him in order to prevent an order of specific performance.305 The Court 
engaged in veil peeking to order specific performance both against Mr. 
Lipman and the company, calling the company “a device and a sham, a mask 
which [seller] holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the 
eye of equity.”306 
As in other fields, veil peeking in contract law is usually a matter of 
contract construction or gap filling. A classic example is whether a contractual 
right of first refusal in connection with a sale of shares applies to indirect 
share transfers (e.g., through the sale of shares in a holding company) when 
the contract language in question is silent in this regard.307 
In other cases, veil peeking can also be used for purposes of contract 
interpretation in determining the will of the parties. Take, for instance, a 
network of three related contracts entered into by Company A on one hand, 
and each of Companies X, Y, and Z, on the other, with Y and Z being wholly 
owned subsidiaries of parent Company X. If these contracts use the same 
defined terms, and Company X adopts a certain interpretation of a given 
defined term under its contract with Company A, veil peeking could serve to 
 
303 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(c) (2005). 
304 For the U.K. law precedents, see, for example, Gilford Motor Co., Ltd. v. Horne [1933] Ch 
935 and Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442. 
305 Jones, [1962] 1 All ER at 442-44. 
306 Id. at 445. 
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impute the same interpretation for the contracts between Company A and 
Company Y. This is still another form of veil peeking without any prejudice 
to asset partitioning. Such interpretation would be based on the economic 
reality that wholly owned subsidiaries are subject to the parent’s control and 
are not independent economic actors with independent wills—the same 
rationale that underlies veil peeking in antitrust jurisprudence.308 
Moreover, just as lawmakers often embrace veil peeking explicitly, leaving 
little room for judicial gap filling, contracting parties may choose to attribute 
shareholder-related events to the legal persons that are party to the contract. 
Change-of-control clauses, a common feature of commercial practice, provide 
a prominent example of explicit veil peeking by contracting parties. By 
including a change-of-control clause, contracting parties essentially opt out 
of the default legal regime of regulatory partitioning by making any change 
in the control structure of the company an event of default under the relevant 
agreement. The prevalence of change-of-control clauses in commercial 
contracts shows that the identity of the controlling shareholder is often a 
relevant business consideration for the contracting parties, which are not 
always best served by the regime of strict regulatory partitioning.309 
J. Miscellaneous Regulations and Social Sanctions 
Beyond the various fields examined above, veil peeking also appears in 
numerous controversies concerning the interpretation of specific statutes and 
regulations, as illustrated by the prominent U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.310 One area in which veil peeking can be 
used to compromise creditors’ rights without impinging on limited liability or 
entity shielding is that of homestead exemptions. Various jurisdictions grant 
special exemptions to the home of individual debtors against creditor claims.311 
Homestead exemptions are effectively a form of asset partitioning imposed by 
law without the creation of a separate legal person. However, a veil peeking 
question then emerges when the real property in question, which serves as the 
home for natural persons, is formally owned by legal persons controlled by 
such individuals. Many U.S. courts have engaged in veil peeking by finding 
that the corporation is a sham engineered by creditors to circumvent 
 
308 See supra notes 197–200. 
309 See generally, Li et al., supra note 155 (examining events of default in debt contracts). 
310 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). A majority of the Supreme Court held that closely held corporations 
could assert religious beliefs under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000BB to -4)—a statute that was silent on the treatment 
of corporate entities—in order to avoid complying with the requirement of contraceptive coverage 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18122). Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785. 
311 See generally George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950). 
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homestead protection or have otherwise held that homestead protection 
attaches to the possessory interest, rather than ownership of the property.312 
Finally, veil peeking is not necessarily limited to the application of legal 
rules, but may also extend to social sanctions. In 2019, consumers have 
proposed to boycott luxury gym chains Equinox and SoulCycle after Stephen 
Ross, a major shareholder and board chair of their parent company, hosted a 
fundraiser for Donald Trump.313 Predictably, the companies sought to rebut 
the boycott premised on veil peeking by asserting their independent values 
and disclaiming control by Ross, which they described as a “passive investor” 
who “is not involved in the management of either business.”314 More recently, 
consumers and investors’ “buy Black” initiatives in 2020 exemplifies veil 
peeking by social movements to favor Black-owned corporations and their 
shareholders.315 
CONCLUSION 
The dominant view among legal and economic scholars is that the 
corporation is a nexus for contracts, and that asset partitioning is the essential 
function of corporate legal personality. This view is, however, incomplete. 
Regulatory partitioning is critical in allowing the corporation to serve as a 
nexus for contracts and regulation. The legal advantages and disadvantages 
bestowed on this separate nexus are critical for the success and development 
of the corporate form. A significant portion of corporations existing in the 
real-world appear to be formed for regulatory rather than contracting reasons. 
Even more so than asset partitioning, the form of regulatory partitioning 
provided by legal personality does not operate in an all-or-nothing fashion 
but is rather “on and off.” As in John Dewey’s classical formulation, “for the 
purpose of law the conception of ‘person’ is a legal conception; put roughly, 
 
312 See, e.g., In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303, 316 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that Texas homestead 
protection attaches to an individual’s possessory interest in property owned by a corporation); Ritter 
v. Citizens Bank (In re Ritter), No. 07-61071, 2009 WL 1024656, at *4 n.24 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 
26, 2009) (surveying cases including In re Perry, supra, and concluding that “across-the-board” rules 
for “homogeniz[ing] the Texas homestead decisions” have proven unhelpful). 
313 See Brian Ries, Owner of SoulCycle and the Miami Dolphins Faces Outrage and Calls for Boycott over 
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315 See, e.g., 180 Black-Owned Businesses to Support, N.Y. MAG. (June 18, 2020), 
https://nymag.com/strategist/article/black-owned-businesses-support-shop.html [https://perma.cc/7H27-
MJ6K]; Paul Vigna & Mischa Frankl-Duval, Stocks of Black-Owned Companies Surge on Juneteenth Holiday, 
WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2020, 5:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stocks-of-black-owned-companies-
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‘person’ signifies what law makes it signify.”316 The state frequently sticks to 
the corporation as a separate nexus for regulation for the attribution of legal 
rights, duties, powers, privileges, disabilities, and immunities. However, 
when the phenomenon of corporate control is critical to the efficacy of the 
regulatory scheme at hand, lawmakers and courts engage in veil peeking, 
overcoming regulatory partitioning to attribute the identity or legal status of 
shareholders to the corporation. In other circumstances, veil peeking is used 
to level the regulatory playing field across different organizational forms. 
Just as asset partitioning and regulatory partitioning constitute different 
categories of corporate separateness subject to different tradeoffs, the 
exceptions to asset partitioning and regulatory partitioning are equally 
distinct. Veil piercing and veil peeking are driven by different considerations 
and fulfill different functions, but have been conflated in legal scholarship 
and practice. This Article unpacked veil peeking, showing that it is distinct 
from veil piercing, but not a unitary category unto itself. It also offered 
normative guidance for the resolution of veil peeking disputes. Courts 
should not condition veil peeking on restrictive criteria such as fraud or 
commingling of assets, but should instead consider the purpose of the 
regulatory scheme in question. 
The ongoing relevance of veil peeking casts doubt on the syllogistic 
approaches that seek to derive precise legal consequences from the different 
theories of corporate personality—concession or artificial entity theory, 
contractual theory, or real entity theory. The continued relevance of this 
particular form of doctrinalism in U.S. legal thought is both surprising and 
unwarranted. Incorporation serves diverse functions that cannot be captured 
by a single theoretical rubric. Corporate separateness is an “on-and-off” 
mechanism used to achieve different transactional and regulatory purposes. 
The time has come to unbundle them. 
 
316 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 655 (1926). 
